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Grimm: Parental Consent for Minor's Abortion

COMMENT

AMERICAN ACADEMY OF PEDIATRICS v.
LUNGREN: CALIFORNIA'S PARENTAL
CONSENT TO ABORTION STATUTE AND
THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY
This scheme forces a young woman in an already dire situation to choose between two fundamentally unacceptable alternatives: notifying
a possibly dictatorial or even abusive parent and
justifying her profoundly personal decision in an
intimidating judicial proceeding to a black-robed
stranger. For such a woman, this dilemma is
more likely to result in trauma and pain than in
an informed and voluntary decision. 1

I.

INTRODUCTION

In American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren,2 hereinafter American Academy of Pediatrics II,3 the First District

1. Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 479 (1990) (Marshall, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
2. American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren,. 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 546 (Ct.
App. 1994) (per Stein, J; the other panel members were Newsom, Acting P.J., and
Dossee, J.), review granted, 882 P.2d 247 (Cal. Sept. 29, 1994). The American
Academy of Pediatrics is a group of health care providers. Other named plaintifTrespondents include the California Medical Association and the American College
of Obstetricians and Gynecologists. Defendant-appellant Daniel E. Lungren was the
Attorney General for the State of California at the time of publication. District
Attorneys for all counties in California are also named defendant-appellants.
3. American Academy of Pediatrics v. Van de Kamp, 263 Cal. Rptr. 46 (Ct.
App. 1989), remanded sub nom. American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren, No.
884-574, slip op. (Cal. Super. Ct. 1992), affd, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 546 (Ct. App.
1994), modified, 94 C.D.O.S. 5184 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994), reh'g denied, 1994 Cal.
App. LEXIS 813 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 1, 1994), review granted, 882 P.2d 247 (Cal.

463

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1995

1

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 3 [1995], Art. 2

464

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25:463

Court of Appeal of California unanimously held that
California's parental consent law for minors seeking abortions 4

Sept. 29, 1994). Because this case was previously heard at the California Court of
Appeal with the name American Academy of Pediatrics v. Van de Kamp, 263 Cal.
Rptr. 46 (Ct. App. 1989), see infra notes 21-27 and accompanying text, the earlier
case (263 Cal. Rptr. 46), will be referred to as American Academy of Pediatrics I,
and the instant case will be referred to as American Academy of Pediatrics II.
4. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25958 (West Supp. 1995). In significant
portion, the parental consent statute reads:
(a) Except in a medical emergency requiring immediate
medical action, no abortion shall be performed upon an
unemancipated minor unless she first has given her written consent to the abortion and also has obtained the
written consent of one of her parents or legal guardian.
(b) If one or both of an unemancipated, pregnant minor's
parents or her guardian refuse to consent to the performance of an abortion, or if the minor elects not to seek
the consent of one or both of her parents or her guardian,
an unemancipated pregnant minor may file a petition
with the juvenile court . . . . The hearing shall be set
within three days of the filing of the petition . . . .
(c) At the hearing on a minor's petition brought pursuant
to subdivision (b) for the authorization of an abortion, the
court shall consider all evidence duly presented, and order
either of the following:
If the court finds that the minor is sufficiently
mature and sufficiently informed to make the decision on her own regarding an abortion, and that
the minor has, on that basis, consented thereto, the
court shall grant the petition.
(2) If the court finds that the minor is not sufficiently mature and sufficiently informed to make
the decision on her own regarding an abortion, the
court shall then consider whether performance of
the abortion would be in the best interest of the
minor. In the event that the court finds that the
performance of the abortion would be in the minor's
best interest, the court shall grant the petition
ordering the performance of the abortion without
consent of, or notice to, the parents or guardian. In
the event that the court finds that the performance
of the abortion is not in the best interest of the
minor, the court shall deny the petition ....

(1)

(0 It is a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine of not more

than one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by imprisonment in
the county jail of up to 30 days, or both, for any person
to knowingly perform an abortion on an unmarried or
unemancipated minor without complying with the requirements of this section.
1d.
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is unconstitutiona1. 5 The court of appeal found that the parental consent law violates the right to privacy explicitly guaranteed by the California Con$titution. 6
In evaluating the constitutionality of the statute, the court
of appeal applied a test recently mandated by the California
Supreme Court for all right to privacy cases. 7 The court of
appeal affirmed the judgment of the trial court and sustained a
permanent injunction against enforcement of the parental
consent law. 8 The decision confirmed that minors share in the
protections of the California Constitution's right to privacy. 9
Nevertheless, in late September, 1994, the California Supreme
Court granted the State's petition requesting review of the
court of appeal's decision. 10
This comment will discuss the background right to privacy
jurisprudence,11 examine the grounds under which the court
of appeal decided the case,12 and review appellants>l3 and
respondents' arguments. 14 Based upon the opposing parties'
arguments and controlling precedent, the author will explain
why the California Supreme Court should affirm the court of
appeal's decision. 15

5. American Academy of Pediatrics II, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 548.
6. ld. at 555.
7. The court of appeal followed the analysis set forth in Hill v. NCAA, 865
P.2d 633 (Cal. 1994). Hill involved a claim by a college athlete that her right to
privacy under the California Constitution was violated by mandatory drug testing
policies of the NCAA. The California Supreme Court held that it was improper for
all right to privacy cases to be analyzed under a compelling interest standard. In·
stead, the supreme court devised a three-step balancing test to determine whether
a violation of the right to privacy is justified. See Hill, 865 P.2d at 654-56. See
infra notes 97-115 and accompanying text for a discussion of the impact of Hill on
American Academy of Pediatrics 11.
8. American Academy of Pediatrics II, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 559.
9. See id. at 549.
10. American Academy of Pediatrics II, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 546, review granted,
882 P.2d 247 (per Lucas, C.J., Kennard, J., Arabian, J., and Baxter, J.) (Cal. Sept.
29, 1994).
11. See infra notes 37-88 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 91-123 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 125-179 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 181-222 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 223-274 and accompanying text.
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II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN
ACADEMY OF PEDIATRICS II

In 1987, the California Legislature passed Assembly Bill
2274. 16 The bill required a minor seeking an abortion to obtain the written consent of one of her parents. 17 In the alternative, the minor could petition the juvenile court for permission to proceed with the abortion. 18 If the court determined
that the minor was sufficiently mature to decide on her own
whether to obtain an abortion, the court would be required to
grant permission. 19 If however, the court found the minor to
be too immature to make the decision, the court would make it
for her. 20
The newly enacted statute was challenged immediately by
a group of health care providers and the American Civil Liberties Union. 21 These groups argued that the parental consent
requirement violated California's constitutional guarantee of
privacy.22

16. 1987 Cal. Stat. 1237 (amending CAL. Cw. CODE § 34.5 and adding CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25958 (West Supp. 1995)). See supra note 4 for relevant text from the parental consent statute.
17. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25958(a) (West Supp. 1995). See supra
note 4 for relevant text from the parental consent statute.
18. Id. § 25958(b). See supra note 4 for relevant text from the parental consent statute.
19. Id. § 25958(c)(1). See supra note 4 for relevant text from the parental consent statute.
20. Id. § 25958(c)(2). See supra note 4 for relevant text from the parental consent statute.
21. See American Academy of Pediatrics v. Van de Kamp, 263 Cal. Rptr. 46
(Ct. App. 1989), remanded sub nom. American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren,
No. 884-574, slip op. (Cal. Super. Ct. 1992), affd, 32 Cal. Rptr 2d 546 (Ct. App.
1994), modified, 94 C.D.O.S. 5184 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994), reh'g denied, 1994 Cal.
App. LEXIS 813 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. I, 1994), review granted, 882 P.2d 247 (Cal.
Sept. 29, 1994). See supra note 3 for an explanation of the titles used to describe
the two appearances of this case before the First District Court of Appeal of California.
The American Civil Liberties Union is a public interest group involved with
issues concerning constitutional protections.
22. See American Academy of Pediatrics I, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 51 n.5. Plaintiffs
asserted that the statute violated rights to informational and autonomy privacy, as
well as the right to equal protection. See American Academy of Pediatrics II, 32
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 559 app.
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The superior court granted a preliminary injunction
against enforcement of the statute,23 and the State appealed.
The court of appeal affirmed the preliminary injunction and
remanded the case to superior court to determine if the statute
met the strictures of California's Constitution. 24 The court of
appeal instructed the superior court that the state could justify
any infringement of the fundamental right to privacy only if
the parental consent statute furthered a compelling interest. 25
This interest must be one in which "the utility of imposing the
conditions must manifestly outweigh any resulting impairment
of constitutional rights.,,26 Finally, the court of appeal required that there be no less burdensome alternatives to the
statute. 27

"

On remand, the State asserted several interests. Specifically, the trial court considered whether the statute furthered
state interests in "the medical, emotional and psychological
welfare of minors .... [Other stated interests included] reducing the teenage pregnancy rate, and ... preserving and fostering the parent-child relationship."28 The trial court found that
while the state's interests were all compelling, the statute
failed to further any of them. 29 In fact, the court found the
legislation would injure most of these interests, if it had any
impact on them at all. 30
.

23. See American Academy of Pediatrics I, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 47.
24. See id. at 54. The court of appeal noted that the California Constitution
affords more protection for privacy than the United States Constitution: "Since the
time of its enactment, California's constitutional right to privacy has been recognized as being broader than the federal right." Id. at 51.
25. See id. at 54.
26. Id. at 55 (quoting Bagley v. Washington, 421 P.2d 409, 415 (Cal. 1966)).
27. See American Academy of Pediatrics I, 263 Cal. Rptr. 46, 55.
28. American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 546, 550 (Ct.
App. 1994), review granted, 882 P.2d 247 (Cal. Sept. 29, 1994).
29. See id.
30. See id. The trial court admitted evidence that minors suffer no more, and
often less long-term psychological harm from obtaining an abortion than do adults.
See id. at 559-62 app. Furthermore, the trial court found, the alternative to abortion, bringing the pregnancy to term, is statistically more dangerous to the minor
than abortion. See id. The court also found that requiring minors to get parental
permission would increase the physical and emotional danger to the minor. See id.
The court heard evidence that a minor confessing her pregnancy to her parents is
often subject to physical and emotional violence in the home. See id. According to
the evidence at trial, the delay involved in going through the judicial process, as
an alternative to obtaining parents' permission, also increases the danger to the
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Based upon these findings, the trial court held that the
statute violates the right to privacy found in Article I, section 1
of the California Constitution. 31 Thus, the court permanently
enjoined enforcement of the statute. 32 On appeal, the court of
appeal affirmed the judgment of the trial court, thereby upholding the permanent injunction. 33 The State filed a petition
for review, which the California Supreme Court granted. 34 At
the time of this writing, the parties were completing briefing,
and the date for oral argument had not yet been determined.
III. BACKGROUND
The opposing parties in American Academy of Pediatrics II
hold widely disparate views of the applicable law governing the
case. Appellants argue that the standards promulgated by the
United States Supreme Court should guide the California
Supreme Court's determination of the statute's validity.35 Respondents contend that the case must be decided by examining
precedents of California courts interpreting the California
Constitution. 36 A brief discussion of the background of these
two perspectives underscores the ideological gulf separating

minor; the longer the pregnancy progresses, the more dangerous obtaining an abortion becomes. See id.
31. See id. at 550. See infra notes 80-88 and accompanying text for a discussion of the "Privacy Initiative;" the California Constitution's explicit right to privacy.
.
32. American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren, No. 884-574, slip op. (Cal.
Super. Ct. June 5, 1992), affd, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 546 (Ct. App. 1994), modified, 94
C.D.O.S. 5184 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994), reh'g denied, 1994 Cal. App. LEXIS 813 (Cal.
Ct. App. Aug. 1, 1994), review granted, 882 P.2d 247 (Cal. Sept. 29, 1994). The
trial court also ruled that the statute violates the right to informational privacy
and equal protection. See id. at 30, 39.
33. American Academy of Pediatrics 11, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 559.
34. American Academy of Pediatrics 11, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 546, review granted,
882 P.2d 247 (Cal. Sept. 29, 1994).
35. See Appellants' Opening Brief at 9, American Academy of Pediatrics v.
Lungren, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 546 (Ct. App. 1994) (No. A058627), review granted, 882
P.2d 247 (Cal. Sept. 29, 1994) (No. S041459). Appellants argue: "[T)he appropriate
standard against which to measure parental involvement in an unemancipated
minor's abortion decision making is the significant state interest." [d.
36. See Respondents' Answer to Petition for Review at 25, American Academy
of Pediatrics 11 (No. A058627). Respondents argue: "California Courts have long
recognized a special duty to construe California's constitutional provisions independent of any comparable federal rights, especially in the area of individual liberties." [d.
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the parties' positions.
A.

UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT CASES

The modern history of federal abortion cases began in
1973, with Roe v. Wade. 37 In Roe, the United States Supreme
Court ruled that any statute prohibiting women from obtaining
an abortion prior to the viability of the fetus violates their
right to privacy under the United States Constitution. 3s This
ruling invalidated the abortion law in Texas, as well as similar
laws in many other states. 39
Several states reacted to Roe's broad holding by passing
legislation concerning peripheral abortion issues, such as waiting periods,40 spousal notification,41 and parental consent.42

37. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). In Roe, a pregnant woman challenged a Texas statute
that prohibited obtaining or performing abortions for any reason other than protecting the life of the mother. The Court reproduced the statute, in significant
portion, which read:
If any person shall designedly administer to a pregnant
woman or knowingly procure to be administered with her
consent any drug or medicine, or shall use towards her
any violence or means whatever externally or internally
applied, and thereby procure an abortion, he shall be
confined in the penitentiary not less than two nor more
than five years . . . .
Roe, 410 U.S. at 117 (quoting TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1191 (West 1968».
38. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 114. The Court noted that there is no explicit right
of privacy in the United States Constitution. [d. at 152. Instead, the Court cited
the rights to privacy that have been found to implicitly exist in both the Ninth
and Fourteenth Amendments:
This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or, as the
District Court determined, in the Ninth Amendment's
reservation of rights to the people, is broad enough to
encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.
[d. at 153.
39. See id. at 118 n.2 for a list of other abortion statutes which were over·
turned or otherwise aifectedby Roe's holding.
40. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-15-202 (1991); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §
311.726 (Baldwin 1991); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3205 (Supp. 1994); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2919.12 (Anderson 1993).
41. See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAws § 23-4.8-2 (1989); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.735
(Baldwin 1991); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3209 (1989).
42. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-21·4 (1992); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 720, para. 515 .
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Through its analysis of cases challenging these statutes, the
Court more closely defined the scope of the right to privacy as
it applies to abortion. 43 Without overturning Roe, the Court
thus narrowed a woman's privacy right to obtain an abortion." Although the right to obtain an abortion prior to the
viability of the fetus remained, the Court had opened the door
for restrictive state legislation in peripheral areas.
1.

Parental Consent Statutes

Beginning in the late 1970s, the United States Supreme
Court heard a series of cases involving parental consent statutes. 45 In the first of these cases, Planned Parenthood of Cent.
Missouri v. Danforth,46 the Court struck down a parental consent statute,47 holding that "[c]onstitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically only when one attains the
state-defined age of majority."48 The Court found that the
(Smith· Hurd 1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 16·34·2·4 (Bums 1993).
43. See, e.g., City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416
(1983) (waiting period); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (parental consent);
Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mis80uri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (spousal
notification).
44. See, e.g., City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416
(1983) (waiting period); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (parental consent);
Planned Parenthood of Cent. Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (spousal
notification).
45. See, e.g., City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416
(1983); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428
U.S. 52 (1976).
46. 428 U.S. 52 (1976). Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri and two phy·
sicians whose practice included performing abortions challenged the Missouri stat·
ute. See id. at 56.
47. See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.020 (Vernon 1978). The statute provided a crim·
inal penalty for physicians performing abortions, other than those abortions which
were required to protect the life of the mother. The statute also required that the
spouse of the woman seeking an abortion give written consent for the abortion
and "the written consent of one parent or person in loco parentis of the woman if
the woman is unmarried and under the age of eighteen years . ..." Id. (emphasis
added).
48. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74. Regarding the spousal consent provision, the
Court held that the state could not give the spouse such a unilateral veto: "[WJe
cannot hold that the State has the constitutional authority to give the spouse
unilaterally the ability to prohibit the wife from terminating her pregnancy, when
the State itself lacks that right." Id. at 70.
The Court applied the same reasoning to the parental consent provision:
Just as with the requirement of consent from the spouse,
so here, the State does not have the constitutional author·
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blanket parental consent provision at issue granted an absolute third party veto, and thus, violated the minor's constitutional right to privacy.49 Nevertheless, the Court explained
that states need only prove that parental consent statutes
meet a significant state interest in order to stand. 50
The Court clarified its view of the constitutional requirements for a valid parental consent statute in Bellotti v.
Baird. 51 In Bellotti, the Court reviewed a statute containing a
judicial bypass procedure as a substitute for parental consent. 52 The judicial bypass procedure allowed a minor whose
parents refused consent to bring a suit in the superior court.53
If the minor proved to the judge that an abortion was in her
best interests, the judge had the authority to permit the abor-

ity to give a third party an absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto over the decision of the physician and his
patient to terminate the patient's pregnancy, regardless of
the reason for withholding the consent.
1d. at 74.
49. See id. at 75. The Court explained: "The fault with [the parental consent
provision] is that it imposes a special-consent provision, exercisable by a person
other than the woman and her physician, as a prerequisite to a minor's termination of her pregnancy and does so without a sufficient justification for the restriction." 1d.
50. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 75. Although the Court acknowledged that minors
share the constitutional rights of adults, it concluded that states have greater
discretion in regulating minors than adults: "The Court . . . long has recognized
that the State has somewhat broader authority to regulate the activities of children than of adults. It remains, then, to examine whether there is any significant
state interest in conditioning an abortion on the consent of a parent . . . ." 1d. at
74-75 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
51. 443 U.S. 622 (1979). William Baird, acting as the director of a parents
group, a physician who performed abortions, and a pseudonymous pregnant minor
going by the name "Mary Moe," challenged the statute as unconstitutional. 1d. at
626. AB quoted by the Court, the statute required, in part: "If the mother is less
than eighteen years of age and has not married, the consent of both the mother
and her parents is required." 1d. at 625 (quoting MAss. GEN. LAws ANN., ch. 112,
§ 12S (West Supp. 1979».
52. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 643-44. The Court accepted the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts' certification of several questions regarding the application
of the statute as authoritative. First, the statute required parental notice in every
case where it was possible. Second, the statute gave the judge the authority to
refuse to grant permission for the abortion even when the minor had demonstrated that she had sufficient maturity to make the decision for herself. 1d. at 631-32.
53. 1d. at 625 (quoting MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 112, § 12S (West Supp.
1979)) ("If one or both of the mother's parents refuse such consent, consent may
be obtained by order of a judge of the superior court for good cause
shown . . . .").
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In rejecting the parental consent statute at issue in
Bellotti, the Supreme Court held that the statute's judicial
bypass procedure failed to adequately protect the rights of the
minor. 55 The plurality, in what four concurring Justices called
an "advisory opinion,"56 described the constitutional requirements for a judicial bypass procedure that would sufficiently
protect the privacy interests of the minor. 57 In the system de-

54. See Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 630 (citing Baird v. Attorney General, 360 N.E.
2d 288, 293 (Mass. 1977».
55. Id. at 651. The Court held:
Although it satisfies constitutional standards in large part,
[Massachusetts' parental consent law) falls short of them
in two respects: First, it permits judicial authorization for
an abortion to be withheld from a minor who is found by
the superior court to be mature and fully competent to
make this decision independently. Second, it requires
parental consultation or notification in every instance,
without affording the pregnant minor an opportunity to
receive an independent judicial determination that she is
mature enough to consent or that an abortion would be in
her best interests.
Id.
56. Id. at 656 n.4. In his concurring opinion, in which Justices Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun joined, Justice Stevens noted that, "[ulntil and unless
Massachusetts or another State enacts a less restrictive statutory scheme, this
Court has no occasion to render an advisory opinion on the constitutionality of
such a scheme." Id.
The same group of Justices argued that the Massachusetts statute permi'tted
a unilateral third-party veto and thus fell under the holding of Danforth: "[N)o
minor in Massachusetts, no matter how mature and capable of informed
decisionmaking, may receive an abortion without the consent of either both her
parents or a superior court judge. In every instance, the minor's decision to secure
an abortion is subject to an absolute third-party veto." Id. at 653-54.
57. See Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 647-48. The plurality explained:
[E)very minor must have the opportunity-if she so desires-to go directly to a court without first consulting or
notifying her parents. If she satisfies the court that she is
mature and well enough informed to make intelligently the
abortion decision on her own, the court must authorize her
to act without parental consultation or consent. If she fails
to satisfy the court that she is competent to make this
decision independently, she must be permitted to show
that an abortion nevertheless would be in her best interests. If the court is persuaded that it is, the court must
authorize the abortion. If, however, the court is not persuaded by the minor that she is mature or that the abortion would be in her best interests, it may decline to
sanction the operation.
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scribed, if a minor proved to the trial court that she was sufficiently mature to decide whether to have an abortion, the court
would be required to grant permission. 68
2.

Parental Notification Statutes

Some states passed statutes. reqUlnng that parents be
notified before their minor children could obtain an abortion. 59
The United States Supreme Court reviewed the constitutionality of several of these parental notification statutes. 60
In the first of the parental notification cases, H.L. v.
Matheson,61 the Court noted that parental involvement in a
minor's decision regarding abortion is desirable because parents can "provide medical and psychological data, refer the
physician to other sources of medical history, such as family
physicians, and authorize family physicians to give relevant
data. "62 Thus, the Court upheld the parental notification statute in that case. 63

[d. (emphasis added).
58. [d.
59. Unlike parental consent statutes, parental notification statutes do not reo
quire that minors obtain the permission of a parent. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. §
76-7-305 (1995). So long as the specified number of parents have been notified of
the minor's plans, she can act on her own decision. See id.
60. See, e.g., Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502 (1990) (re·
viewing OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2919.12(b)(1) (1987), which allows a physician to
perform an abortion on a minor only if he or she provided twenty·four hours no·
tice to one of the minor's parents. In the alternative, the minor's adult brother,
sister, stepparent, or grandparent could be notified as a substitute for the parent
if the minor and the other relative each filed an affidavit stating that the minor
feared physical, sexual, or severe emotional abuse from one of her parents. See
Akron Ctr., 497 U.S. at 507.); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990) (review·
ing MINN. STAT. § 144.343(2}-(7) (1988), which provides: "[Nlo abortion shall be
performed on a woman under 18 years of age until at least 48 hours after both of
her parents have been notified." Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 422.); H.L. v. Matheson, 450
U.S. 398 (1980) (reviewing UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-305 (1978), which provides: "To
enable the physician to exercise his best medical judgment he shall ... notify, if
possible, the parents or guardian of the woman upon whom the abortion is to be
performed, if she is a minor or the husband of the woman, if she is married.").
61. 450 U.S. 398 (1980). See supra note 60.
62. Matheson, 450 U.S. at 411.
63. [d. at 413. The Court reasoned: "[Tlhe statute plainly serves important
state interests, is narrowly drawn to protect only those interests, and does not
violate any guarantees of the Constitution." [d.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1995

11

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 3 [1995], Art. 2

474

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25:463

In Hodgson v. Minnesota,64 however, the Court struck
down a statute's requirement that both parents of a minor
seeking an abortion be notified before the procedure can be
performed. 65 The Court explained that the asserted benefits of
parental notification could be met adequately without requiring notification of both parents. 66
In Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health,67 decided on the
same day as Hodgson, the Court held that any parental notification statute which includes a judicial bypass procedure that
meets the standards set in Danforth and Bellotti is constitutional. 68 A majority of the Court in each of the parental notification cases adopted the "advisory opinion" from Bellotti, which
set forth the elements of a constitutionally valid parental consent statute. 69

3.

California Legislature's Response to Federal Jurisprudence

In enacting its own parental consent statute, the California Legislature tailored its efforts to meet the requirements of
Danforth, Bellotti, and their progeny.70 These efforts led sev-

'64. 497 U.S. 417 (1990). See supra note 60.
65. Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 450. The Court stated: "[T)he requirement that both
parents be notified, whether or not both wish to be notified or have assumed
responsibility for the upbringing of the child, does not reasonably further any
legitimate state interest." Id. The Court emphasized that any legitimate state
interest served by a two-parent notification requirement would be met adequately
by notifying only one parent. Id. The Court noted the potential impact of the twoparent notification requirement in dysfunctional families, where it foresaw the
possibility of physical and emotional abuse. See id. at 451 n.36.
66. Id. at 450.
67. 497 U.S. 502 (1990). See supra note 60 for a description of the relevant
statute.
68. Akron Ctr., 497 U.S. at 511. See supra notes 48-58 and accompanying text
for a discussion of these standards. The Court acknowledged that parental notification statutes are not as intrusive as parental consent statutes. Akron Ctr., 497
U.S. at 511. However, since the judicial bypass permitted by the statute at issue
met the requirements of Danforth and Bellotti, the Court did not address the issue
of whether parental notification statutes are exempted from the need for an adequate bypass procedure. See Akron Ctr., 497 U.S. at 510.
69. See, e.g., Matheson, 450 U.S. at 411; Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 420; Akron Ctr.,
497 U.S. at 511.
70. The legislature took its stated interests in passing the statute directly
from the United States Supreme Court cases. Appellants' Opening Brief at 20-21,
American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 882 P.2d 247 (Cal. Sept. 29, 1994)
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eral commentators to predict that the statute would meet a
federal constitutional challenge. 71 Although the statute appears to pass federal constitutional muster, respondents in
American Academy of Pediatrics II claim that conformity with
federal standards is not the pertinent issue;72 rather, they
argue, the California Supreme Court should evaluate the statute under the right to privacy found in the California Constitution and related California cases. 73 Commentators have, for
the most part, agreed that the statute would fail to withstand
such a challenge under the California Constitution. 74

(No. S041459). The California statute avoids the absolute third party veto that
proved fatal to the statute in Danforth. Malena R. Calvin, Note, The Constitution·
ality of California's Parental Consent to Abortion Statute, 21 GOLDEN GATE U. L.
REV. 591, 604 (1991). Calvin noted:
Consistent with Danforth, California's statute does not impose an absolute veto power which may be exercised by
someone other than the pregnant minor and her physician. The statute provides that if the minor's parents
refuse to grant their consent, the minor may file a petition with the juvenile court for a hearing on whether she
may avoid the parental consent requirement.
[d. The wording of the California statute, especially the judicial bypass procedure,
tracks the language of the Bellotti plurality in a clear attempt to follow the "advisory opinion" issued in that case. See supra notes 51-58 arid accompanying text for
a discussion of Bellotti.
71. See, e.g., Calvin, supra note 70; Gregory W. Herring, Comment, Eroding
Roe: the Politics and Constitutionality of California's Parental Consent Abortion
Statute, 20 PAC. L.J. 1167, 1191 (1989) (each predicting that the California parental consent statute would pass federal constitutional muster); but see Robert W.
Lucas, Comment, Aborting the Rights of Minors? Questioning the Constitutionality
of California's Parental Consent Statute, 19 PAC. L.J. 1487, 1507-10 (1988) (predicting that the California parental consent statute would fail to meet federal constitutional standards).
72. Respondents' Answer to Petition for Review at 4, American Academy of
Pediatrics II, (No. A058627). Respondents note that, "the State maintains, once
again, that the contours of state constitutional privacy rights should be defined by
current interpretations of federal law. This position ignores both decades of precedent and the autonomy. of the state judiciary to independently interpret the California Constitution." [d.
73. See id. at 3. Respondents contend: "The real issue here is whether, under
the California Constitution, the statute's severe burden on the fundamental reproductive rights of California's young women is justified." [d.
74. See, e.g., Calvin, supra note 70, at 606; Lucas, supra note 71, at 1513-16;
Herring, supra note 71, at 1204-05.
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CALIFORNIA'S RIGHT TO PRIVACY JURISPRUDENCE

In 1969, four years prior to the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Roe v. Wade,75 the California Supreme
Court determined that a woman's right to choose an abortion
represents a fundamental privacy interest. 76 In People v.
Belous,77 the California Supreme Court rejected a section of
the California Penal Code that made it illegal for a physician
to perform an abortion for any reason other than when "necessary to preserve" the life of the mother.7s The California Supreme Court held that the law violated a woman's fundamental right to make reproductive choices. 79
Three years later, the people of California passed the "Privacy Initiative."so This initiative amended the California Con-

75. 410 u.S. 113 (1973).
76. See People v. Belous, 458 P.2d 194, 199 (Cal. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
915 {1970}. The Belous court noted that both the United States Supreme Court
and the California Supreme Court had repeatedly recognized that the right to
privacy concerning marriage, family, and sex constituted a fundamental right. ld.
It was not until four years later, however, in Roe, that the United States Supreme
Court applied that same reasoning to the right to obtain an abortion. See supra
notes 37·39 and accompanying text for a discussion of Roe.
77. 458 P.2d 194 (Cal. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915 {1970}.
78. ld. The Penal Code read:
Every person who provides, supplies, or administers to
any woman, or procures any woman to take any medicine,
drug, or substance, or uses or employs any instrument or
other means whatever, with intent thereby to procure the
miscarriage of such woman, except as provided in the
Therapeutic Abortion Act of the Health and Safety Code,
is punishable by imprisonment in the state prison.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 274 (West 1988).
79. Belous, 458 P.2d at 206. The California Supreme Court reasoned that the
original purpose of the law, to protect women's lives, was no longer furthered.
Rather, the incidence of illegal abortions, and the higher rate of death and serious
infection associated with them, showed that the law in fact harmed the stated
interests. ld. at 200·02. The supreme court cited a letter from medical professionals and deans of the California medical schools: "These recorded facts bring one
face-to-face with the hard, shocking-almost brutal-reality that our statute designed in 1850 to protect women from serious risks to life and health has in modern times become a scourge." ld. at 20l.
80. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1. The initiative added an explicit right to privacy to
the California Constitution. The relevant constitutional section, as later amended,
reads: "All people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights.
Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing and
protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness and privacy." ld.
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stitution to explicitly include the right to privacy.81
The ballot pamphlet argument written by the Privacy
Initiative's proponents indicates the intended scope of the
explicit right to privacy.82 This pamphlet clarifies that the
new right to privacy applies to minors: "There should be no
ambiguity about whether our constitutional freedoms are for
every man, woman and child in this state."aa
In one of the earliest California Supreme Court cases to
interpret this amendment, the supreme court explained that
the intent of the Privacy Initiative's proponents was to create
"a legal and enforceable right of privacy for every Californian."84 Thus, minors apparently share in the privacy
protections guaranteed by the California Constitution. 85
In general, the federal right to privacy "appears to be
narrower than what the voters approved in 1972 when they
added 'privacy' to the California Constitution."86 Specifically
in the area of reproductive rights, the California Supreme
Court has held the California privacy right to be more exten-

Whether this new explicit right is broader in scope than the implicit federal right
to privacy presents a pivotal issue in American Academy of Pediatrics II.
81. Id. The ballot pamphlet argument advanced by proponents of the initiative
has been cited to explain the reasoning behind the initiative. The ballot pamphlet
reads, in part: "The right of privacy is the right to be left alone. It is a funda·
mental and compelling interest." KENNETH CORY & GEORGE R. MOSCONE, PRO·
POSED AMENDMENTS To CONSTITUTION. PROPOSITIONS AND PROPOSED LAws To·
GETHER WITH ARGUMENTS. GENERAL ELECTION Nov. 7, 1972, at 27 (1972) (empha·
sis added).
82. See CORY & MOSCONE, supra note 81, at 26·27. The California Supreme
Court noted the value of ballot pamphlets as sources of information regarding the
rationale for public initiatives: "California decisions have long recognized the pro·
priety of resorting to such election brochure arguments as an aid in construing
legislative measures and constitutional amendments adopted pursuant to a vote of
the people." White v. Davis, 533 P.2d 222, 234 n.11 (Cal. 1975).
83. Respondents' Answer to Petition for Review at 18, American Academy of
Pediatrics v. Lungren, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 54 (Ct. App. 1994) (No. A058627) (quoting
CORY & MOSCONE, supra note 81, at 27) (emphasis added).
84. White, 533 P.2d at 234 (emphasis added). The supreme court emphasized
that the pamphlet arguments represented "in essence, the only 'legislative history'
of the constitutional amendment available to us." Id.
85. See id. The scope of minors' rights to privacy under the California Consti·
tution, contrasted with the United States Constitution, poses an important issue in
American Academy of Pediatrics II.
86. City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson, 610 P.2d 436, 439 n.3 (Cal. 1980).
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sive than its federal counterpart: "Certainly it is true that our
State Constitution has been construed to provide California
citizens with privacy protections encompassing procreative
decisionmaking-broader, indeed, than those recognized by the
Federal Constitution."s7 Thus, the California Supreme Court
has viewed the addition of an explicit right to privacy to the
California Constitution as an expansion of the federal right.88
The expanded scope of California's right to privacy was put
to the test in the court of appeal in American Academy of Pediatrics II. Respondents reminded the court of California's independent jurisprudence in the area of privacy rights. s9 The
court of appeal accepted respondents' argument and applied a
"compelling interest" test. 90
IV. THE CALIFORNIA COURT OF APPEAL'S ANALYSIS:
AMERICAN ACADEMY OF PEDIATRICS v. LUNGREN
In affirming the permanent injunction against the statute,
the court of appeal in American Academy of Pediatrics II considered and rejected several of appellants' theories. 91 Specifically, the court considered whether the case must be remanded
to be tested against the requirements of a new California Supreme Court decision. 92 The court also reviewed appellants'
assertion that compelling state interests justify any infringement by the parental consent statute upon the right to priva-

87. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 787 (Cal. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
206 (1993).
88. See Committee to Defend Reprod. Rights v. Myers, 625 P.2d 779, 784 (Cal.
1981).
89. See Respondents' Brief at 12-14, American Academy of Pediatrics II (No.
A058627).
90. See American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 546, 555
(Ct. App. 1994), review granted, 882 P.2d 247 (Cal. Sept. 29, 1994). The court of
appeal held that the compelling interest standard was applicable, instead of the
federal "significant interest" standard which had been required in Danforth and its
progeny. See id. See supra notes 46-69 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Danforth and its progeny.
91. See American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 546 (Ct.
App. 1994), review granted, 882 P.2d 247 (Cal. Sept. 29, 1994).
92. See id. at 551. The court of appeal noted that the California Supreme
Court's recent decision in Hill v. NCAA, 865 P.2d 633 (Cal. 1994), requires all
California right to privacy cases to be analyzed under its reasoning. See id.
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cy.93 Finally, the court considered appellants' contention that
parents' right to be involved in decisions concerning their children supersedes minors' privacy interests. 94 Based upon its
analysis of these issues, the court of appeal held that the statute impermissibly violates minors' right to privacy under the
California Constitution. 95 Accordingly, the court of appeal affirmed the permanent injunction against enforcement of the
parental consent statute. 96

A. THE EFFECT OF HILL V. NCAA
In January 1994, the California Supreme Court rejected
the traditional rule that a "compelling interest" analysis be
applied to all right to privacy cases. 97 In place of the traditional rule, the court devised a new three-part test. 98 Thus, in
order to determine whether there has been a violation of the
right to privacy guaranteed by the California Constitution,
California courts must now evaluate three factors: first, a le-

93. See id. at 558-59.
94. See American Academy of Pediatrics II, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 558-59.
95. [d. at 555-56.
96. [d. at 559.
97. Hill v. NCAA, 865 P.2d 633, 654-56 (Cal. 1994). The California Supreme
Court, analyzing several of its previous decisions which applied the compelling
interest standard, held:
The particular context, i.e., the specific kind of privacy
interest involved and the nature and seriousness of the
invasion and any countervailing interests, remains the
critical factor in the analysis. Where the case involves an
obvious invasion of an interest fundamental to personal
autonomy, e.g., freedom from involuntary sterilization or
the freedom to pursue consensual familial relationships, a
"compelling interest" must be present to overcome the
vital privacy interest. If, in contrast, the privacy interest
is less central, or in bona fide dispute, general balancing
tests are employed.
[d. at 653.
98. See id. at 654-56. The California Supreme Court summarized the new rule:
Based on our review of the Privacy Initiative, we hold
that a plaintiff alleging an invasion of privacy in violation
of the state constitutional right to privacy must establish
each of the following: (1) a legally protected privacy interest; (2) a reasonable expectation of privacy in the circumstances; and (3) conduct by defendant constituting a serious invasion of privacy.
[d. at 656.
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gaIly protected privacy interest must be involved; second, the
complaining party must have a reasonable expectation of privacy; and third, the alleged violation must constitute a serious
invasion of the privacy interest. 99 If a court analyzing these
elements determines that a prima facie case for invasion of
privacy has been established, the court must then consider any
defenses asserted. 100
The court of appeal in American Academy of Pediatrics II
interpreted this new "Hill" test as a balancing test, in which a
strong showing in one element could make up for a weaker
showing in another. 101

99. See American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 546, 554
(Ct. App. 1994), review granted, 882 P.2d 247 (Cal. Sept. 29, 1994) (citing Hill,
865 P.2d at 654-56). Hill involved a challenge to the NCAA mandatory drug-testing rules for student athletes. Applying the three parts of its newly announced
test, the supreme court reasoned that student athletes have legally protected privacy interests in not being observed directly during urination. Nevertheless, the
supreme court held that the drug-testing program did not violate students' reasonable expectation of privacy, because student athletes commonly come to expect to
be observed unclothed by team personnel and to be subjected to various physical
and medical examinations. By voluntarily joining a team which was a member of
the NCAA, the supreme court noted, a student athlete implicitly agreed to a lesser
expectation of privacy. Finally, the supreme court reasoned that, despite the lessened expectation of privacy, direct monitoring of urination constituted a serious
invasion of privacy. See Hill, 865 P.2d at 657-59.
100. Hill, 865 P.2d at 655-56. In describing the new method for evaluating
right to privacy cases, the California Supreme Court noted:
The diverse and somewhat amorphous character of the
privacy right necessarily requires that privacy interests be
specifically identified and carefully compared with competing or countervailing privacy and non privacy interests in
a 'balancing test . . . .' Invasion of a privacy interest is
not a violation of the state constitutional right to privacy
if the invasion is justified by a competing interest.
[d.

101. American Academy of Pediatrics II, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 554. The court of
appeal noted:
For example, where it is shown that the privacy interest
at issue is very strong, a plaintiff will be able to make
out a prima facie case even though his or her expectation
of privacy is not extremely strong, or the invasion of the
privacy interest is not extremely serious.
[d.

In its application of Hill's three-part test to the facts of American Academy
of Pediatrics II, the court of appeal held that the importance of the privacy interest at issue bolstered the other two elements:
The plaintiffs in this case clearly made a prima facie
showing of an unconstitutional invasion of the right to
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Discussing each of the three Hill elements as they applied
to American Academy of Pediatrics II,I02 the court of appeal
emphasized that the right to choose whether to obtain an abortion is "an exceedingly fundamental privacy interest."103 Although a minor was acknowledged to have a reduced general
expectation of privacy, the court stated that her privacy expectations regarding procreative choices are strong and valid. 104
Finally, the court of appeal found that the statute seriously
infringes upon two separate privacy interests: the right to
choose privately to obtain an abortion and the right actually to
obtain an abortion. 105 Because "this legislation creates the
possibility that a minor will be compelled to bear. a child
against her wishes,,,I06 the court of appeal felt that "[i]t would
be hard to imagine a more egregious breach of social
norms.,,107
Upon balancing the Hill elements, the court held that
plaintiff-respondents had established a prima facie case that
the parental consent statute violates minors' constitutionally
protected privacy interests. 108

privacy. Moreover, although all three elements of the
cause of action have been established, the strength of the
interest at issue is such that the plaintiffs need only have
shown that the minors have some expectation of privacy
albeit not as great an expectation as an adult might
have, and that the invasion of that interest is real-as
opposed to overwhelming.
Id. at 555-56.
102. See American Academy of Pediatrics II, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 554-56. See id.
at 554 (discussing the "legally protected privacy interest" requirement). See id. at
555 (discussing the "reasonable expectation of privacy" requirement). See id. at
555-56 (discussing the "seriousness of invasion of privacy interest" requirement).
103. Id. at 554. The court of appeal reasoned: "There can be no question but
that the right to choose whether or not to give birth, including the right to choose
an abortion, is not only an interest involving autonomy privacy, but an exceedingly
fundamental privacy interest." Id.
104. Id. at 555. The court of appeal noted: "Many adolescents, even those in
the most functional of homes, do not discuss their procreative choices with their
parents, and they certainly have no expectation of discussing them with a judge."
Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. American Academy of Pediatrics II, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 555.
108. Id. See supra note 101 for discussion that the strength of the privacy issue
allowed for a lesser showing in the other two elements of the Hill test.
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B. THE JUSTIFICATION FOR VIOLATING THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY

After determining that respondents had established a
prima facie case for invasion of privacy, the court of appeal
next considered whether the state had a sufficient justification
for the statute's infringement upon minors' right to privacy.I09 Under Hill, the burden of proof falls on the defendant,
here, appellants, to show that the invasion of the right to privacy is justified. lIO Hill requires that a compelling· countervailing interest must be substantially furthered where the
privacy interest at issue is "fundamental to personal autonomy."ll1

Because appellants failed to prove that any interests, compelling or otherwise, would be furthered by the parental consent statute, the court of appeal held that the statute's infringement of minors' right to privacy is unconstitutional.1I2
Moreover, the court of appeal echoed the trial court's determination that the current health care system provides a less
burdensome alternative to the parental consent statute. 113
Although Hill was decided after the trial court in Ameri-

109. See American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 546, 556
(Ct. App. 1994), review granted, 882 P.2d 247 (Cal. Sept. 29, 1994).
110. Hill, 865 P.2d at 657. The California Supreme Court explained in Hill that
a defendant can prevail in a right to privacy case by proving, as an affirmative
defense, "that the invasion of privacy is justified because it substantively furthers
one or more countervailing interests. Plaintiff, in turn, may rebut a defendant's
assertion of countervailing interests by showing there are feasible and effective
alternatives to defendant's conduct which have a lesser impact on privacy interests." [d.
111. [d. at 653. The Hill opinion is somewhat unclear as to whether the fundamental nature of the privacy interest should be evaluated prior to application of
the new three-part test (thus supplanting the three-part test in some cases), or is
simply part of the analysis of defenses following establishment of plaintiffs prima
facie case. The court of appeal in American Academy of Pediatrics II applied the
compelling interest test to the State's defense of justification. See American Academy of Pediatrics II, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 556.
112. American Academy of Pediatrics II, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 556.
113. [d. The court of appeal noted that the current system, in which neither
parental consent nor a judicial bypass procedure is required for a minor to obtain
an abortion, protects minors' interests without infringing upon protected privacy
rights: "It also appears that the existing medical system in fact serves these asserted interests and that the legislation therefore is not the least intrusive means
available of furthering them." [d. at 550.
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can Academy of Pediatrics II had announced its opinion, the
court of appeal held that there was no need to remand the case
to apply the new Hill test. U4 The court believed that the trial
court had, in its compelling interest analysis, substantially
addressed each element of Hill's balancing test. ll5
The court of appeal also rejected appellants' argument that
the trial court had erred in considering evidence that the parental consent statute would harm state interests rather than
further them. us Appellants had argued that, in a facial attack, the legislature's rational belief that a statute would
achieve its desired results makes moot any evidence to the contrary.ll7 The court of appeal disagreed, however, explaining
that acceptance of the legislative facts at face value would be
inappropriate in this case because a fundamental right was
implicated U8
C.

THE MINOR'S PRIVACY INTEREST VERSUS THE PARENTS'
INTEREST

Lastly, the court of appeal rejected appellants' argument
that parents' interests in being involved in their children's
medical decisions supersede minors' privacy interests. u9
114. Id. at 554.
115. Id. The court of appeal stated: "[T)he reasoning and conclusions of the
superior court remain valid under the [Hill) test, and that the judgment, accordingly, should be affirmed without remand." Id.
116. American Academy of Pediatrics II, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 556-57.
117. Id. at 557. The court of appeal summarized appellants' argument: "The
State's position is that where, as here, there is a facial challenge to a law, the
only question is whether the Legislature rationally could believe that the law will
further a compelling state interest." Id.
118. Id. The court of appeal explained:
When legislation invades a fundamental right, the courts
have the duty to look behind and legislative finding and
independently determine whether a particular invasion is
justified . . .. [Thus, u)nder the circumstances of the
present case, it was entirely appropriate for the superior
court to consider such evidence as was presented to determine if [California's parental consent statute) in fact furthered a compelling interest, and if that interest might be
furthered by less restrictive means.
Id. at 557-58.
119. American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 546, 558 (Ct.
App. 1994), review granted, 882 P.2d 247 (Cal. Sept. 29, 1994).
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While recognizing parents' strong interest in being involved in
important decisions regarding their children, the court of appeal held that minors' constitutionally protected privacy interests must take precedence. 12o Specifically in the area of procreative decisions, the court noted that, "even under the more
limited right of privacy guaranteed by the Federal Constitution, a child's right of privacy exceeds the parent's right to be
involved in the abortion decision."121 According to the court of
appeal, California, with its more stringent privacy standard,
should protect the minor's privacy interest even more vigorously.122

D.

CONCLUSION OF THE CALIFORNIA COURT OF APPEAL

Because appellants failed to prove at trial that the statute
would further any of its stated interests, the court of appeal
affirmed that California's parental consent statute is an unnecessary and impermissible violation of minors' protected right to
privacy under the California Constitution. 123 On appeal to the
California Supreme Court, the parties renew their respective
arguments. 124

120. Id. at 559. The court of appeal cited a California Supreme Court case to
support its finding: "In some situations, however, there may be a conflict of inter·
ests (between parent and child). In these situations, the legal system should pro·
tect the child's interests." Id. (citing In re Angelia P., 623 P.2d 198, 202 (Cal.
1981)).
,121. Id. The court of appeal cited the federal parental consent cases to demonstrate that even under the United States Constitution's reduced privacy protection,
parents may not be afforded an absolute veto over the minor's decision to obtain,
an abortion. Id. (citing Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428
U.S. 52, 74-75 (1976); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643-44 (1979». See supra
notes 45-69 and accompanying text for a discussion of federal parental involvement
cases. See generally Jennifer Wohlstadter, Note, Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc.: The Constitutionality of Abortion Clinic Buffer Zones, 25 GoLDEN GATE U.
L. REv. 543 (1995) (discussing the standard of review applying to abortion clinic
buffer zones).
122. American Academy of Pediatrics II, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 559. The court of
appeal stated: "We have concluded that the right of privacy guaranteed by the
California Constitution permits less intrusion than does the federally guaranteed
right. There is, accordingly, even greater reason to conclude that any parental
interests in the child's decisions or welfare must bow to the child's right of privacy." Id.
123. Anlerican Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 546, 559 (Ct.
App. 1994), review granted, 882 P.2d 247 (Cal. Sept, 29, 1994).
124. See Appellants' Opening Brief at 7-45, Anlerican Academy of Pediatrics v.
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V. APPELLANTS' ARGUMENTS
Appellants argue that the court of appeal mistakenly considered evidence that the parental consent statute would be
harmful rather than beneficial. 125 Appellants further contend
that minors' privacy interests are less protected than those of
adults. 126 Thus, citing a long line of federal cases, appellants
argue that the proper judicial standard for evaluating parental
consent cases is the significant interest standard, rather than
the compelling interest standard. 127 Even if the compelling
interest standard is appropriate, appellants maintain
California's parental consent statute meets that standard. 128
Appellants further contend that the court of appeal misapplied
the elements of the new Hill 129 test. 130 According to appellants, the court of appeal improperly ignored parents' interests
in maintaining the parent-child relationship and in being involved in important decisions regarding their child's upbringing. 131 Finally, appellants argue that the parental consent
Lungren, 882 P.2d 247 (Cal. 1994) (No. S041459). See Respondents' Answer to
Petition for Review at 15-28, American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 32 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 546 (Ct. App. 1994) (No. A058627). See infra note 180 for explanation of
use of Respondents' Answer to Petition for Review as the latest available articulation of respondents' arguments.
125. See Appellants' Opening Brief at 19-22, American Academy of Pediatrics v.
Lungren, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 546 (Ct. App. 1994) (No. A058627), review granted, 882
P.2d 247 (Cal. Sept. 29, 1994) (No. S041459). See infra notes 134-39 and accompanying text.
126. See Appellants' Opening Brief at 22-35, American Academy of Pediatrics II
(No. S041459). See infra notes 142-46 and accompanying text.
127. See Appellants' Opening Brief at 9, American Academy of Pediatrics II (No.
S041459) (citing Planned Parenthood of Cent. Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52,
74 (1976)). Appellants argue that both federal and California cases have recognized
the significant interest test as the proper measure of whether minors' privacy
rights have been violated. See id. See intro notes 141-46 and accompanying text
for a discussion of this argument.
128. See Appellants' Opening Brief at 10, American Academy of Pediatrics 11
(No. S041459). See infra notes 147-54 and accompanying text for a discussion of
this argument.
129. Hill v. NCAA, 865 P.2d 633 (Cal. 1994).
130. See Appellants' Opening Brief at 19-38, American Academy of Pediatrics II
(No. S041459). See infra notes 155-69 and accompanying text for a discussion of
appellants' contention.
131. See Appellants' Petition for Review at 12, American Academy of Pediatrics
II (No. A058627). Appellants argue:
There is no balancing with the child's need for parental
guidance and support. There is no mention of, let alone
balancing with, the societal norms underlying parent-child
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statute does not violate minors' rights to informational privacy
or equal protection. 132
A.

STATE NEED ONLY SHOW A RATIONAL BASIS FOR
LEGISLATIVE FACTS

According to appellants, in a facial challenge of a statute,133 the State merely needs to show that the legislature
could rationally have believed the statute would further its
stated interests. 134 Thus, appellants repudiate the relevance
of evidence presented at trial that the parental consent statute
would instead injure its stated interests. 135 Instead, appellants contend that the California Supreme Court should "accord significant weight and deference"136 to the legislature's
findings because they were taken from language found in United States Supreme Court cases. 137 Indeed, appellants argue

relationships and the responsibilities of parents . . .. The
decision below does not recognize any constitutionally
permissible mandatory role for parents in unemancipated
minors' abortion decision making.
[d.

132. See Appellants' Opening Brief at 38-45, American Academy of Pediatrics II
(No. 8041459). See infra notes 172-73 and accompanying text for a discussion of
appellants' informational privacy argument. See infra notes 174-79 and accompanying text for a discussion of appellants' equal protection argument.
133. Because the statute has been enjoined since it was initially passed, there
is no data available concerning its real-world impact. Consequently, any challenge
must be a "facial" attack; a challenge based on the statute's inherent unconstitutionality rather than upon any impermissible impact.
Appellants argue: "The statutory provisions under review have never been
implemented and the determinations of their validity by the lower courts have
consequently been limited to analysis of their facial validity." Appellants' Petition
for Review at 8, American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 546
(Ct. App. 1994) (No. A058627).
134. Appellants' Opening Brief at 19-20, American Academy of Pediatrics II (No.
8041459). Appellants argue, "[T]he validity of a statute does not depend on the
actual existence of legislative facts but on whether the Legislature could rationally
believe such facts to be established." [d. (citing People v. Mistriel, 241 P.2d 1050,
1051 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1952».
135. [d. at 21. Appellants argue: "It is irrelevant to that process that these
facts may be disputed or opposed." [d. (citing People v. Oatis, 70 Cal. Rptr. 524,
528 (Ct. App. 1968».
136. [d. at 22.
137. Appellants' Opening Brief at 20, American Academy of Pediatrics II (No.
8041459). Appellants describe the legislative findings and their origins:
In enacting AB 2274 the Legislature made five specific
findings. These were (a) the medical, emotional, and psy-
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that these findings should be considered presumptively constitutional due to their source. 13B Appellants maintain: "Under
such circumstances it cannot be assumed that the Legislature
acted irrationally in relying upon determinations of the
nation's highest court."139
B.

"SIGNIFICANT STATE INTEREST" IS THE APPLICABLE
STANDARD

Appellants argue that a long line of federal cases, beginning with Planned Parenthood of Cent. Missouri v.
Danforth,140 establishes that the significant state interest test
applies to alleged violations of minors' constitutional
rightS.141 The federal cases hold that minors' privacy interests
are not coextensive with those of adults.142 Due to minors'

..

chological consequences of an abortion are serious and can
be lasting, particularly when the patient is an immature
minor; (b) the capacity to become pregnant and the capacity for exercising mature judgment concerning the wisdom
of an abortion are not logically related; (c) minors often
lack the ability to make fully informed choices that take
account of both immediate and long-range consequences of
their action; (d) parents ordinarily possess information
essential to a physician's exercise of his or her best medical judgment concerning a minor child; and (e) parents
who are aware that their minor daughter has had an
abortion may better ensure that she receives adequate
medical attention subsequent to her abortion . . . . Findings (a) and (b) come directly from ... H.L. v. Matheson,
supra, 450 U.S. 398 at 408, finding (c) comes from
Bellotti v. Baird, supra, 443 U.S. at 640, and finding (d)
comes from H.L. v. Matheson, supra, at 411.
[d. at 20-21.
138. [d. at 21-22. Appellants argue: "Moreover, although the ultimate constitutional interpretation rests with this court, a presumption of constitutional sufficiency is particularly appropriate in circumstances where the Legislature has enacted
a statute with the relevant constitutional limitations clearly in mind." [d.
139. [d. at 21.
140. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
141. Appellants' Opening Brief at 9, American Academy of Pediatrics v.
Lungren, 882 P.2d 247 (Cal. 1994) (No. S041459). Appellants invoke the United
States Supreme Court opinions in Danforth and its progeny: "Danforth was the
first of the eight parental involvement cases and established that the appropriate
standard against which to measure parental involvement in an unemancipated
minor's abortion decision making is the significant state interest." [d. (citing
Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74). See supra notes 46-69 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Danforth and its progeny.
142. See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979). In Bellotti, the United
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"special vulnerabilities,"143 states may exercise more discretion in regulating minors' behavior than would be acceptable if
applied to adults.144 This discretion, according to appellants:
is justified by the minor's need for parental
concern, sympathy and attention, by the recognition that during the formative years of childhood
and adolescence minors often lack the experience, perspective and judgment to recognize and
avoid choices that could be detrimental to them,
and by the important recognition that parents
nurture and direct the upbringing of their children and have the right and high obligation to
prepare their children for additional obligations
and this duty includes the inculcation of moral
standards, religious beliefs and elements of good
citizenship. 145

Thus, because the federal jurisprudence suggests the application of a significant interest standard, appellants contend that
the court of appeal erred in applying the compelling interest
standard in American Academy of Pediatrics II. 146
C.

THE STATUTE FURTHERS THE STATE'S INTERESTS

Appellants maintain that, even if a compelling state interest must be met, California's parental consent statute satisfies
that requirement. 147 Appellants point out that both the trial
States Supreme Court noted: "We have recognized three reasons justifying the
conclusion that the constitutional rights of children cannot be equated with those
of adults: the peculiar vulnerability of children; their inability to make critical
decisions in an informed, mature manner; and the importance of the parental role
in child rearing." [d.
143. Appellants' Opening Brief at 10, American Academy of Pediatrics II (No.
S041459).
144. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 635. The Court noted: "(A)lthough children generally
are protected by the same constitutional guarantees against governmental deprivations as are adults, the State is entitled to adjust its legal system to account for
children's vulnerability ...." [d.
145. Appellants' Opening Brief at 9-10, American Academy of Pediatrics II (No.
S041459) (citing Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 635, 642-43).
146. [d. at 7.
147. Appellants' Opening Brief at 10, American Academy of Pediatrics v.
Lungren, 882 P.2d 247 (Cal. Sept. 29, 1994) (No. S041459). Appellants assert:
"Assuming arguendo a compelling state interest is required under Hill, [the parental consent statute) satisfies such a standard." [d.
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court and the court of appeal acknowledged the state has two
valid compelling interests: the interest in protecting minors
and the interest in maintaining the parent-child relationShip.l48 Again citing language from federal cases, appellants
argue that these compelling interests are furthered by the
parental consent statute. 149 Appellants assert that, by providing parents the opportunity to participate in their daughter's
abortion decision, the statute furthers both stated interests. 160 Relying once more on pronouncements by the United
States Supreme Court, appellants maintain that the state can
safely depend "on the presumption the parents will act in the
best interests of the minor."161

148. [d. at 10-11. The court of appeal agreed with the trial court:
[W)e agree with the superior court that the health and
welfare of minors is indeed a compelling state interest.
We also agree that the related interest of fostering parent-child relationships may be compelling, and that the
State may have a legitimate interest in involving parents
in the decisions of their children . . . .
American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 546, 558 (Ct. App.
1994), review granted, 882 P.2d 247 (Cal. Sept. 29, 1994).
149. Appellants' Opening Brief at 11, American Academy of Pediatrics II (No.
S041459). Appellants argue that for "some minors the abortion decision raises
profound moral and religious concerns and parental consultation can assist the
minor." [d. (citing Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 640). Furthermore, "some minors will be
lonely and even terrified. Parents can provide compassionate and mature advice."
[d. (citing Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502, 520 (1990». Finally, appellants argue that parents can provide doctor with psychological and health
data. [d. (citing H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 419 (1980».
150. [d. at 11.
151. Appellants' Opening Brief at 11, American Academy of Pediatrics II (No.
S041459) (citing Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 495(1990». In the context of
his separate opinion in Hodgson, Justice Kennedy discussed the presumption that
parents act in the best interests of their children:
The law's concept of the family rests on a presumption
that parents possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment required for making
life's difficult decisions. More importantly, historically, it
has recognized that natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their children . . . . As
with so many other legal presumptions, experience and
reality may rebut what the law accepts as a starting
point; the incidence of child neglect and abuse cases attest to this. That some parents "may at times be acting
against the best interests of their children" ... creates a
basis for caution, but is hardly a reason to discard wholesale those pages of human experience that teach that
parents generally do act in the child's best interests.
[citation omitted] The only cases in which a majority of
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Furthermore, appellants assert, the parental consent statute is the least intrusive method of furthering these compelling
interests. 152 Appellants point out that the statute allows for a
judicial bypass, as well as for the consent of only one parent. 15S Apparently due to its compliance with these two federal requirements, appellants argue that the statute represents
the least intrusive means available. 1M
D. AUTONOMY PRIVACY: APPELLANTS' HILL ANALYSIS

Appellants further argue that the court of appeal incorrectly applied the three-step analysis required by Hill.155 In
analyzing the first Hill element, the existence of a legally protected privacy interest, appellants acknowledge that minors
enjoy a right to privacy regarding reproductive choices under
both the Federal and the California Constitutions. 156 Appellants contend, however, that these rights are limited in
scope. 157 Citing the United States Supreme Court cases which
have addressed parental consent and parental notification
statutes, appellants note that, "[i]n each of these cases the
the Court has deviated from this principle are those in
which a State sought to condition a minor's access to
abortion services upon receipt of her parent's consent to do
so.
Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 495 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part) (emphasis added). Thus, Justice Kennedy explicitly excluded
parental consent statutes from the general presumption that parents act in the
best interests of their children. See id.
152. Appellants' Opening Brief at 15, American Academy of Pediatrics II (No.
S041459).
153. Id. at 15·16. The allowance for a judicial bypass brings the statute within
the requirements of Bellotti's advisory opinion. See supra notes 51-58 and accompanying text for a discussion of Bellotti. The permissibility of a statute that requires only one parent to give consent is derived from Hodgson. See supra notes
64-66 and accompanying text for a discussion of Hodgson.
154. Appellants' Opening Brief at 15, American Academy of Pediatrics II (No.
S041459).
155. See Appellants' Opening Brief at 17-38, American Academy of Pediatrics v.
Lungren, 882 P.2d 247 (Cal. Sept. 29, 1994) (No. S041459). See supra notes 97-115
and accompanying text for discussion of the Hill test.
156. Appellants' Opening Brief at 22-23, American Academy of Pediatrics II (No.
S041459).
157. Id. Appellants note: "The United States Supreme Court has recognized that
an unemancipated minor enjoys a protectable autonomy privacy interest in her
decision making on whether to undergo an abortion to the extent of not permitting
an absolute veto over such decision by a parent." [d.
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Supreme Court approved parental involvement. The Supreme
Court's identification of the social norms involved and the
protectable interests arising therefrom should be dispositive
herein. "158
After reviewing the federal jurisprudence, 159 appellants
argue that the California Supreme Court should follow the
lead of its federal counterpart: "The analysis and precedent of
the United States Supreme Court cases provide not only the
policy fountainhead for AB 2274, they provide brilliant illumination to this court's task of judicial interpretation. "160 Finally, appellants contend that the legislature, rather than the
Judiciary, is the appropriate body "to weigh social science
studies and opinions. "161
Next, appellants address the second Hill element: whether
the parental consent statute violates a reasonable expectation
of privacy.162 Appellants argue that, in our society, minors
have less reasonable expectations of privacy than do
adults. 163 Without specifically discussing the existence of

158. [d. at 23.
159. See id. at 23·32 (citing Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791

(1992); Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502 (1990); Hodgson v.
Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990); H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1980); Planned
Parenthood v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983); Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod.
Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976». Appellants review the United States
Supreme Court's analysis of the issues throughout each of these parental involvement cases. [d. See supra notes 45-69 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the United States Supreme Court's parental consent and parental notification jurisprudence.
160. Appellants' Opening Brief at 33, American Academy of Pediatrics II (No.
S041459).
161. [d. Appellants apparently refer to the evidence introduced at trial and
summarized by the court of appeal in the appendix following the court's opinion.
See American Academy of Pediatrics II, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 559-62 app.
162. See Appellants' Opening Brief at 35-37, American Academy of Pediatrics II
(No. S041459).
163. [d. at 36. Appellants contend: "There is a diminished expectation of privacy
in minors consenting to medical care to the extent of their parents knowledge of
or indeed, in most instances, making of the decision." [d.
While citing cases dealing with minors' privacy rights concerning general
medical care, appellants assert that minors' privacy rights in choosing whether to
have an abortion are similarly curtailed: "[I)t cannot be concluded that minors
have the same expectation of privacy in abortion decision making as adults. It is
not. It is diminished in this arena of decision making as it is generally." [d.
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minors' reasonable expectation of privacy in abortion decisions,
appellants once again invoke the United States Supreme
Court's analysis of parents' responsibility for the "nurture,
support and guidance" of minors.l64 Appellants apparently
see the combination of this parental responsibility with minors'
limited privacy right as justifying the conclusion that minors
have no reasonable expectation of privacy in their decision
whether to obtain an abortion. 165
Hill's third element requires that the invasion of the right
to privacy must be a serious one. l66 Rather than dispute the
seriousness of the parental consent statute's infringement upon
privacy rights directly, appellants incorporate the arguments
from the prior two elements: "[t]he analysis of this final element of a cognizable privacy claim, in the context presented
here, is closely interwoven with the identification of a
protectable privacy interest and the recognition of a reasonable
expectation of privacy and the foregoing analysis of these issues is incorporated here. "167 Appellants' only addition to this
discussion is that the state can rationally assume that parents
will in fact "facilitate" their minor's abortion decision. l66 Otherwise, appellants do not contend that the parental consent
statute's invasion of minors' privacy interests is not serious.
Rather, the thrust of appellants' argument seems to be that,
despite the seriousness of any privacy invasion, countervailing
parental and state interests justify the statute. 169

164. Appellants' Opening Brief at 35, American Academy of Pediatrics II (No.
S041459). Appellants note: "The United States Supreme Court has ... identified
in its analysis of this identical issue our societal norms that the primary responsibility for the nurture, support and guidance of children lies in the parents." Id.
(citing Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 643-44).
165. See id. at 35-37.
166. See Hill, 865 P.2d at 655.
167. Appellants' Opening Brief at 37, American Academy of Pediatrics II (No.
8041459).
168. Id.
169. See id. at 37-38. Appellants argue that balancing the parents' and state's
interests with the minors' privacy interest leads to the conclusion that the invasion of privacy interests does not constitute "an egregious breach of the social
norms . . . ." Id.
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THE PARENTAL CONSENT STATUTE DOES NOT VIOLATE
INFORMATIONAL PRIVACY OR EQUAL PROTECTION
PRINCIPLES

Although the court of appeal explicitly declined to decide
the issues of the statute's violation of rights to informational
privacy and equal protection,170 appellants argue that the
California Supreme Court should address these issues. 171 Appellants contend that the parental consent statute does not violate minors' informational right to privacy because the only
information collected is limited to court documents involved in
the judicial bypass procedure. 172 Furthermore, appellants argue, because the purpose of the judicial bypass is to afford
"minimum due process protection," any incidental invasion of
the informational privacy interest is justified. 173
Appellants also request that the California Supreme Court
reverse the trial court's determination that the parental consent statute violates the California Constitution's equal protection guarantee. 174 The trial court reasoned that the statute
170. American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 546, 559 (Ct.
App. 1994), review granted, 882 P.2d 247 (Cal. Sept. 29, 1994). The court noted:
Plaintiffs contended that by creating and maintaining records relating to the bypass procedures, A.B. 2274 violates
the right to informational privacy. The superior court did
not analyze this argument, concluding that, because the
State had been unable to justify the burden on privacy
rights in general, it also could not justify the burden
placed on informational privacy. Having concluded that
this legislation unconstitutionally interferes with autonomy
privacy, we need not also consider whether it places an
impermissible burden on informational privacy. Nor shall
we consider the constitutional question of whether A.B.
2274 also violates equal protection guarantees.
[d.
171. Appellants' Opening Brief at 38, American Academy of Pediatrics v.
Lungren, 882 P.2d 247 (Cal. Sept. 29, 1994) (No. S041459). Appellants point out:
"It is important that they be decided since each formed an additional independent
basis for the trial court's decision to enjoin AB 2274." [d.
172. [d. at 39. Appellants argue: "The forms adopted by the Judicial Council
seek no more information than is necessary for a court to properly perform its
duties under the statute." [d.
173. [d. at 39-40. Appellants note: "There can be no serious dispute that due
process requirements are a compelling state interest." Appellants' Opening Brief at
40, Americ(ln Academy of Pediatrics II (No. S041459).
174. [d. at 38. The equal protection guarantee of the California Constitution
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regulates pregnant minors who choose to obtain an abortion,
while not regulating pregnant minors who choose to bring their
pregnancy to term.175 Appellants argue that this distinction is
permissible because the two groups are not similarly situated. 176 Appellants cite two specific differences between' these
groups: first, appellants argue that there is a public health
interest in minors receiving prenatal care, while there is no
such interest in minors obtaining an abortion. 177 Second, appellants maintain that an abortion decision involves moral and
ethical choices which are not involved in the decision to continue a pregnancy to term. 178 Because those choosing to end
pregnancy by abortion and those choosing to continue the pregnancy to term are differently situated, appellants argue, the
parental consent statute's regulation of only one of these
groups does not violate equal protection. 179

reads: "A person may not be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law or denied equal protection of the laws . ..." CAL. CONST. art. I § 7(a)
(emphasis added).
175. American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren, No. 884-574, slip op. at 31-34
(Cal. Super. Ct. June 5, 1992). Again, the court of appeal declined to rule on the
equal protection issue. American Academy of Pediatrics 11, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 559.
176. Appellants' Opening Brief at 41, American Academy of Pediatrics 11 (No.
S041459).
177. [d. Appellants argue:
It is critical to the health of the fetus and the unemancipated minor that prenatal care begin as early in the
pregnancy as possible. It is this risk to the as yet unborn, but developing, fetus that justifies providing this
care without parental consent. The health risks to the
pregnant unemancipated minor are personal health risks.
The health risks to the developing fetus, being taken to
term, are public health concerns.
[d. at 42.
178. [d. at 41. Appellants once again return to the United States Supreme
Court's opinions, this time citing Roe v. Wade: "One's philosophy, one's experience,
one's exposure to the raw edges of human existence, one's religious training, one's
attitude toward life and family and their values, and the moral standards one
establishes and seeks to observe, are all likely to influence and color one's thinking and conclusions about abortion." [d. at 44 (citing Roe, 410 U.S. at 116).
179. Appellants' Opening Brief at 45, American Academy of Pediatrics 11 (No.
S041459). Appellants argue: "The differences between these two classes of unemancipated minors are significant and fundamental and it is submitted demonstrate
they are not similarly situated for purposes of equal protection analysis." [d.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol25/iss3/2

32

Grimm: Parental Consent for Minor's Abortion

1995]

PARENTAL CONSENT FOR MINORS' ABORTION

495

VI. RESPONDENTS' ARGUMENTS
According to respondents,180 the unanimous decisions of
the trial and appellate courts that the statute is unconstitutional should be affirmed by the California Supreme Court. 181
Respondents argue that appellants mischaracterize the crucial
issues, fail to confront the lower courts' factual findings, and
substitute dicta from opinions of the United States Supreme
Court for thorough analysis of the constitutional issues presented. 182 The real issue under consideration, according to respondents, is not "whether the California Constitution 'prohibit[s] parental involvement' in a teenager's reproductive decision."183 Rather, respondents contend, the California Supreme
Court must decide whether the parental consent statute's burden on minors' right to privacy under the California Constitution is justified. l84 Respondents argue that each element of

180. At the time of this writing, Respondents' Reply Brief to the Appellant's
Opening Brief had not yet been filed at the California Supreme Court. Thus, the
most recent available articulations of respondents' arguments were Respondents'
Answer to Petition for Review and Respondents' Brief from the earlier proceeding
at the court of appeal.
18l. Respondents' Answer to Petition for Review at 29, American Academy of
Pediatrics v. Lungren, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 546 (Ct. App. 1994) (No. A058627), review
granted, 882 P.2d 247 (Cal. Sept. 29, 1994) (No. S041459). Respondents argue:
"The Superior Court and Court of Appeal have thoroughly and correctly resolved
the issues presented by this case. The statute invades the fundamental reproductive rights of California's young women without justification, and, therefore, violates the California Constitution." [d. at 4-5.
182. [d. at 2. Respondents contend that, "the State offers no basis for doubting
the unanimous conclusions of the trial and appellate courts that this restrictive
law violates the California Constitution. Instead, the State distorts the issues
central to this case, disregards extensive empirical findings and denigrates the
independence of our state Constitution." [d.
183. [d. (quoting Appellants' Petition for Review at 2, American Academy of
Pediatrics II (No. A058627». Appellants repeatedly asserted that the court of
appeal's decision, if left to stand, would "prohibit," parental involvement. See
Appellants' Petition for Review at 2, 3, 11, 12, 13, American Academy of Pediatrics
II (No. A058627). Respondents reply that there is a difference between prohibiting
involvement and striking down a statute that mandates such involvement: "Respondents have never challenged the right of parents to provide guidance to their
children, and no court has ever ruled that the constitutional right to privacy
'prohibits' parental involvement in a daughter's reproductive decision. Such a decision would indeed be an extraordinary intrusion into family privacy." Respondents'
Answer to Petition for Review at 23, American Academy of Pediatrics II (No.
A058627).
184. Respondents' Answer to Petition for Review at 3, American Academy of
Pediatrics II (No. A058627).
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the test set forth in Hill v. NCAA 185 was properly analyzed by
the court of appeal. 188 Moreover, respondents urge the California Supreme Court to independently evaluate the validity of
the statute under California law, rather than bow to proclamations from the United States Supreme Court. 187 Because the
current system does a better job than the parental consent
statute of furthering the state's interests, respondents contend,
the parental consent statute is not justified. ISS Finally, respondents renew their arguments that the parental consent
statute violates constitutional rights to informational privacy
and equal protection. 189

A.

RESPONDENTS' HILL ANALYSIS

Respondents argue that the court of appeal properly applied the Hill test. 190 Respondents point to California Supreme Court holdings to support the argument that, "the intimate and life-altering decision of whether to become a parent
is at the core of fundamental autonomy interests protected by
the California constitutional right to privacy."191 According to
respondents, these cases conclusively establish minors' legally
protected privacy interest in making reproductive choices. 192

185. 865 P.2d 633 (Cal. 1994).
186. See Respondents' Answer to Petition for Review at 17-21, American Academy of Pediatrics 11 (No. A058627).
187. See id. at 24-27.
188. See id. at 21-23.
189. See id. at 27-28.
190. Respondents' Answer to Petition for Review at 16-21, American Academy
Pediatrics v. Lungren, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 546 (Ct. App. 1994) (No. A058627).
191. Respondents' Answer to Petition for Review at 17, American Academy of
Pediatrics 11 (No. A058627) (citing Conservatorship of Valerie N., 707 P.2d 760
(Cal. 1985) (sterilization as form of contraception); Committee to Defend Reprod.
Rights v. Myers, 625 P.2d 779 (Cal. 1981) (abortion); People v. Belous, 458 P.2d
194 (Cal. 1969) (abortion), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915 (1970».
Respondents point out that these same three cases were cited in Hill as
concerning prime examples of fundamental autonomy privacy rights. ld. at 17-18
(citing Hill, .865 P.2d at 653 n.ll (majority opinion), 670 (Kennard, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in the judgment».
192. ld. Respondents discuss the broad nature of California's privacy right,
arguing that it protects minors as well as adults. Moreover, respondents address
appellants' argument that minors have a less extensive right to privacy than
adults:
In some instances, of course, the State has an interest in
regulating conduct which is compelling as applied to chil-
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Respondents next argue that minors have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in their reproductive decision-making. 193 Respondents distinguish pregnant minors from plaintiffs in recent California Supreme Court cases, where the court
held that those plaintiffs' voluntary actions, such as joining an
athletic team or filing a law suit, invalidate their expectations
of privacy.194 Pregnant minors, according to respondents, perform no such voluntary action which should strip them of their
otherwise reasonable expectation of privacy in reproductive
decision-making. 195
Finally, respondents contend that the parental consent
statute's invasion of the right to privacy is indeed serious. l96
By putting substantial obstacles in the way of a minor seeking
an abortion, respondents argue, the statute seriously invades a
protected privacy right. 197 Furthermore, echoing the court of
appeal's opinion, respondents note that the statute "creates the
possibility that a minor will be compelled to bear a child
against her wishes. It would be hard to imagine a more egregious breach of social norms. ,,198
Accordingly, respondents point out, the court of appeal
properly ruled on all three elements of the Hill test. l99 By
satisfying these elements, respondents argue, they have established a prima facie violation of the right to privacy.200

dren, but not adults. However, the State's greater authority results from the application of the constitutional standard in a particular context, not the standard itself,
which does not vary with the age or cognitive capacity of
the individual.
1d. at 18 (citing Valerie N., 707 P.2d 760).
193. 1d. at 19.
194. Respondents' Answer to Petition for Review at 19, American Academy of
Pediatrics 11 (No. A058627) (citing Hill, 865 P.2d 633; Heller v. Norcal Mut. Ins.
Co., 876 P.2d 999 (Cal. 1994».
195. 1d.
196. 1d. at 20. According to respondents, "[t]his penal statute clearly imposes a
severe burden on a fundamental right which must satisfy the highest standard of
constitutional justification." 1d.
197. 1d.
198. Respondents' Answer to Petition for Review at 20, American Academy of
Pediatrics 11 (No. A058627) (quoting American Academy of Pediatrics 11, 32 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 555).
199. 1d. at 21.
200. See id. at 16-21.
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Respondents next address appellants' justification for this
invasion of minors' constitutional rights. 201 The fundamental
nature of the privacy interest at issue led the court of appeal
to rule that the parental consent statute must further a compelling interest. 202 Respondents point out that the State had
"failed completely to show that the burden ... was justified .... "203 Indeed, respondents argue, the statute would injure state interests in protecting minors and maintaining the
parent-child relationship.204 Thus, according to respondents,
the parental consent statute's violation of the right to privacy
is not justified, regardless of the standard of review. 205
B.

THE INDEPENDENCE OF CALIFORNIA JURISPRUDENCE

Respondents further contend that California's constitutional jurisprudence has long been independent from federal doctrine, particularly in the area of the right to privacy and reproductive rights. 206 Because the California right to privacy has

201. See id. at 21. Following establishment of the prima facie violation of the
right to privacy, Hill requires defendants to demonstrate that countervailing interests justify the invasion of privacy. See Hill, 865 P.2d at 655-56.
202. Respondents' Answer to Petition for Review at 16, American Academy of
Pediatrics II (No. A058627). Respondents quote the Hill mlijority opinion: "Where
the case involves an obvious invasion of an interest fundamental to personal autonomy, e.g., freedom from involuntary sterilization or the freedom to pursue consensual familial relationships, a 'compelling interest' must be present to overcome
the vital privacy interest." Id. (quoting Hill, 865 P.2d at 653). Respondents also
cite Justice Kennard's separate opinion in Hill: "[T)he mlijority recognizes and
accepts the existing law that in appropriate circumstances the compelling interest
standard continues to be applicable to governmental invasions of privacy rights,
and holds that the compelling interest test must be applied when the interest
invaded is fundamental to personal autonomy." Id. at 17 (quoting Hill, 865 P.2d at
670 (Kennard, J., concurring in part and dissenting in the judgment».
203. Id. at 21 (quoting American Academy of Pediatrics II, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
550).
204. Respondents' Answer to Petition for Review at 21, American Academy of
Pediatrics II (No. A058627). Respondents note: "In unusually forceful terms, the
[lower) courts agreed that the statute would damage California youth and their
families." Id.
205. Id. at 22. Respondents note: "These findings are fatal to the constitutionality of the statute, even under a deferential standard of review." Id.
206. Respondents' Answer to Petition for Review at 25, American Academy of
Pediatrics v. Lungren, 32 Cal. Rptr. 546 (Ct. App. 1994) (No. A058627). Respondents point out that California had recognized that the right to choose whether to
obtain an abortion constituted a fundamental right four years before the United
States Supreme Court came to the same conclusion in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
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been viewed by the California Supreme Court as providing
more protection than its federal counterpart,207 respondents
argue that holdings from federal cases cannot be substituted
for the independent judgment of California's courts. 208 According to respondents, the Privacy Initiative's addition of an
explicit right to privacy to the California Constitution indicates
that California's right to privacy is not co-extensive with the
federal right, but is, in fact, broader.209
C.

ADVANTAGES OF THE CURRENT SYSTEM

Respondents also argue that the current system adequately addresses the state's interests in protecting minors.2lo Currently, physicians must ascertain whether any patient is capable of giving informed consent before performing any surgical
procedures. 211 This ethical requirement extends to minors
seeking abortions. 212 Furthermore, respondents argue that

(1973). [d. (citing People v. Belou8, 458 P.2d 194 (Cal. 1969».
207. See, e.g., Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 786 (Cal. 1993) (holding that
the California Constitution. has been construed to provide California citizens with
broader privacy protections encompassing procreative decisionmaking than are
recognized by the United States Constitution); Committee to Defend Reprod. Rights
v. Myers, 625 P.2d 779, 783 n.4 (Cal. 1981) (holding that California's explicit right
to privacy is broader than the implied federal right).
208. Respondents' Answer to Petition for Review at 24-25, American Academy of
Pediatrics II (No. A058627). Respondents argue: "The State's effort to import federal privacy standards wholesale and without analysis into the California Constitution .manifests a fundamental disregard for the independence of state constitutional
law in our federal system." [d.
209. [d. at 26-27. Respondents point out: "This court did not derive Hill's threestep analysis from federal precedent, and indeed, no federal case has applied such
an approach to claims based on the implicit right to privacy in the United States
Constitution." [d. Furthermore, respondents note, Hill removes the state action
requirement that is still required under federal jurisprudence. [d. at 26 (citing
Hill, 865 P.2d at 649 n.8). Respondents state: "Hill's central holding establishes
that the California constitutional right to privacy is broader than and independent
of the implicit right to privacy in the United States Constitution." Respondents'
Answer to Petition for Review at 26, American Academy of Pediatrics II (No.
A058627).
210. Respondents' Brief at 26-27, American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren,
32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 546 (Ct. App. 1994) (No. A058627). Respondents explained: "Respondents proffered substantial evidence at trial demonstrating that the current
system of reproductive health care and counseling adequately protects minors without transgressing their privacy rights." [d.
211. See id. at 27-29.
212. [d. at 29.
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physicians are better situated than judges to evaluate minors'
decision-making ability.213 Moreover, respondents point out
that under the current system, physicians and counselors commonly advise minors to consult parents about reproductive
choices. 214 Thus, respondents argue, the status quo does a
better job than the parental consent statute at furthering the
state's interests, without infringing upon minors' privacy interests. 215
D. THE PARENTAL CONSENT STATUTE VIOLATES
INFORMATIONAL PRIVACY RIGHTS

Additionally, respondents argue, the parental consent
statute violates minors' right to informational privacy.216 Respondents claim that the parental consent statute requires
that minors disclose intimate information regarding their "sexuality, pregnancy, and decision to choose abortion" to judicial
officials. 217 This information, normally the province of only
the minor and medical professionals, would be gathered and
stored as a regular part of judicial record-keeping. 218 Because
213. Respondents' Answer to Petition for Review at 22, American Academy of
Pediatrics II (No. A058627). Respondents contrast the system created by the statute with the status quo:
The State admits that the law will force the majority of
adolescents to navigate through a stressful court proceeding that will delay access to abortion and thus subject
them to a more complicated and potentially risky procedure . . . . The State does not dispute that the doctors
and counselors who serve California's young people provide sensitive guidance to pregnant teenagers, assisting
them to make sound reproductive decisions, encouraging
them to consult their parents or other family members,
and ensuring that they provide informed consent to the
medical services they elect.
[d.
214. [d. at 22.
215. Respondents' Brief at 29, American Academy of Pediatrics II (No. A058627).
Respondents argued: "Thus, because the State failed to show either that the statute protects minors or that no means less invasive of minors' rights, such as the
present system, exist, the State failed to meet both aspects of its burden of proof."
[d.
216. Respondents' Answer to Petition for Review at 27, American Academy of
Pediatrics v. Lungren, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 546 (Ct. App. 1994) (No. A058627).
217. [d.
218. [d. At the court of appeal, respondents argued: "The state-coerced disclosure of sensitive medical and reproductive information to the government, and its
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the lower courts ruled that the parental consent statute furthers no legitimate state interest, respondents argue, mandatory disclosure of this sort of information cannot be justified. 219
E.

THE PARENTAL CONSENT STATUTE VIOLATES EQUAL
PROTECTION PRINCIPLES

Lastly, respondents maintain that pregnant minors seeking an abortion and those seeking medical care in connection
with the decision to bring their pregnancies to term are similarly situated for the purposes of equal protection analysis. 220
Respondents argue: "In the dimensions identified by the State,
the two reproductive options are equivalent. Both require
early access to health care and are profoundly important life
choices."221 Because the parental consent statute treats these
two groups disparately, respondents contend that it violates
the right to equal protection under California's Constitution. 222
VII. AUTHOR'S RECOMMENDATIONS
In deciding whether the parental consent statute
impermissibly violates minors' constitutional rights to privacy
and equal protection, the California Supreme Court will weigh
the aforementioned arguments. 223 In this analysis, the supreme court's primary task will be to evaluate the statute
under prior judicial interpretations of the California Constitution. 224 Such an analysis, independent of sweeping United
indefinite retention in official files, plainly constitute a prima facie violation of the
California Constitution's guarantee of informational privacy." Respondents' Brief at
49-50, .American Academy of Pediatrics II (No. A058627).
219. Respondents' Answer to Petition for Review at 28, American Academy of
Pediatrics II (No. A058627). As respondents argued at the court of appeal, "the
State failed to show that a statute forcing thousands of pregnant adolescents to
juvenile court every year, and the creation of official abortion docket files, will
promote any of the Legislature's stated objectives." Respondents' Brief at 51, Amer·
ican Academy of Pediatrics II (No. A058627).
220. Respondents' Answer to Petition for Review at 28, American Academy of
Pediatrics v. Lungren, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 546 (Ct. App. 1994) (No. A058627).
221. [d. at 28.
222. [d.
223. See supra notes 125-79 and accompanying text for appellants' arguments.
See supra notes 181-222 and accompanying text for respondents' arguments.
224. See Respondents' Answer to Petition for Review at 25, American Academy
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States Supreme Court generalizations, should lead the California Supreme Court to reject the parental consent statute .. A
pragmatic evaluation of the statute's likely impact leads to a
similar conclusion; the statute simply would not accomplish its
purported goals. Unfortunately, the parental consent statute
would more likely have a disastrous effect upon those minors
whom it regulates. Based upon such a constitutional and pragmatic review, the California Supreme Court should affirm the
judgment of the court of appeal and maintain the permanent
injunction against enforcement of the parental consent statute.
A. THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT SHOULD CONSIDER
EVIDENCE OF THE PARENTAL CONSENT STATUTE'S
INEFFICACY

Appellants' argument, that the legislature's rational belief
that a statute will further its goals sustains the statute from
any facial challenge,225 clashes with both California jurisprudence and common sense. 226 Particularly in the face of the
"overwhelming evidence,,227 that the parental consent statute
would in fact harm the state's interests, the California Supreme Court must consider appellants' failure to show ade-

of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 546 (Ct. App. 1994) (No. A058627), review granted, 882 P.2d 247 (Cal. Sept. 29, 1994) (No. S041459). Respondents contend: "California Courts have long recognized a special duty to construe
California's constitutional provisions independent of any comparable federal rights,
especially in the area of individual liberties." Id.
225. See Appellants' Opening Brief at 19-20, American Academy of Pediatrics v.
Lungren, 882 P.2d 247 (Cal. Sept. 29, 1994) (No. S041459). See supra notes 13339 for a discussion of appellants' argument.
226. See Respondents' Brief at 5, American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren,
32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 546 (Ct. App. 1994) (No. A058627). Respondents refuted
appellants' argument at the court of appeal: "No principle of constitutional law
supports the State's extraordinary argument that this court must accept as conclusively true legislative assumptions that the State could not defend at trial, that
the trial court found to be false, and that even now the State does not try to
justify." Id. Nevertheless, appellants renew this argument before the California
Supreme Court. The author hopes that the state's highest court will be at least as
concerned as the court of appeal with the real-world impact of the parental consent statute's invasion of California citizens' fundamental rights.
227. See American Academy of Pediatrics II, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 559-62, app.
See supra note 204 and accompanying text for discussion of respondents' arguments regarding the evidence presented at trial. See infra notes 233-53 and accompanying text for the author's analysis of the significance of the evidence that
the statute will in fact harm the state's interests.
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quate justification for such an intrusive statute. 228
More specifically, the fundamental nature of the right
involved obliges the California Supreme Court to consider the
evidence presented at trial and accepted by the court of appea1. 229 In each of the supporting cases appellants cite, the
interest involved was less than fundamental. 230 The right to
choose whether to obtain an abortion, however, is "clearly
among the most intimate and fundamental of all constitutional
rights. "231 The California Supreme Court has held that "the
ordinary deference a court owes to any legislative action vanishes when constitutionally protected rights are threatened. "232 Thus, the California Supreme Court should acknowledge the evidence introduced at trial concerning the
efficacy of the parental consent statute.

228. Despite the strength of the evidence presented at trial, appellants ask the
California Supreme Court to rely on legislative assumptions as to the efficacy of
the statute. See Appellants' Opening Brief at 19-20, American Academy of Pediatrics 11 (No. S041459).
As respondents pointed out to the court of appeal: "This Court thus 'would
abandon [its] constitutional duty if [it] took at face value' the legislature's justifications for the statute." Respondents' Brief at 6, American Academy of Pediatrics 11
(No. A058627) (quoting Spiritual Psychic Science Church v. City of Azusa, 703
P.2d 1119, 1126 (Cal. 1985».
229. Respondents' Brief at 4-8, American Academy of Pediatrics 11 (No.
A058627). Because the challenged law burdens California citizens' fundamental
rights, the supreme court cannot unquestioningly accept empirically untrue legislative assumptions. On the contrary, the supreme court must affirmatively evaluate
whether the sacrifice of fundamental rights is actually justified. [d. at 6.
230. See Appellants' Opening Brief at 20, American Academy of Pediatrics 11
(No. S041459) (citing People v. Mistriel, 241 P.2d 1050, 1051 (Cal. 1952) (legislature may pass law classifying marijuana as "narcotic"); People v. Oatis, 70 Cal.
Rptr. 524, 528 (Ct. App. 1968) (legislature may pass law prohibiting possession of
marijuana despite disputed evidence as to its danger); and National Org. for Reform of Marijuana Laws v. Gain, 161 Cal. Rptr. 181, 184-85 (Ct. App. 1979)
(courts properly defer to legislative discretion when scientific debate exists as to
health risks of marijuana».
231. Committee to Defend Reprod. Rights v. Myers, 625 j..2d 779, 793 (Cal.
1981). The California Supreme Court held that, "under article I, section 1 of the
California Constitution all women in this state rich and poor alike possess a fundamental constitutional right to choose whether or not to bear a child." [d. at 784.
232. Spiritual Psychic Science Church, 703 P.2d at 1126 (fortune-telling is protected free speech).
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B. THE PARENTAL CONSENT STATUTE WOULD HARM THE
STATE'S INTERESTS

It is bitterly ironic that the parental consent statute, ostensibly passed to protect minors from their "special vulnerabilities," would in fact injure minors' emotional and physical
well-being if implemented. 233 Minors typically suffer no
longterm psychological or physical effects from choosing to
obtain an abortion;234 rather, the most common reaction to an
abortion among both minors and adults is relief. 235 Evidence
shows that abortion is a medically safe procedure which is far
safer than carrying a pregnancy to term.238
1.

The Parental Consent Statute Would Endanger Minors'
Physical and Emotional Well-Being

The statute's requirements would likely result in delayed
abortions for many teenagers due to scheduling of the judicial
bypass procedure. 237 Any delay increases the physical dan-

233. See American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 546, 550
(Ct. App. 1994), modified, 94 C.D.O.S. 5184 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994), reh'g denied,
1994 Cal. App. LEXIS 813 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 1, 1994), review granted, 882 P.2d
247 (Cal. Sept. 29, 1994). The court of appeal noted: "The evidence was nothing
less than overwhelming that the legislation would not protect these interests, and
would in fact injure the asserted interests of the health of minors and the parentchild relationship." Id.
234. See id. at 559 app. The court stated: "[T)he evidence was that minors who
choose to undergo abortion experience a sense of self-esteem and sense of control
equal to, and ultimately greater than, that experienced by those who choose to
carry to term." Id.
235. See American Academy of Pediatrics 11, No. 884-574, slip op. at 7 (Cal.
Super. Ct. June 5, 1992), affd, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 546 (Ct. App. 1994) (No.
A058627), review granted, 882 P.2d 247 (Cal. Sept. 29, 1994) (No. S041459). The
trial court reviewed extensive findings from witnesses representing "a wide range
of disciplines." See id. The court noted: "Both the American Psychological Association and the American Psychiatric Association have thoroughly reviewed the published research in this area and have concluded that for most women, abortion
poses no threat to their psychological or emotional well-being." Id.
236. See American Academy of Pediatrics 11, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 559 app.
"[T]eenage girls are 24 times as likely to die of childbirth as of a first-trimester
abortion . . . ." Margaret Carlson, Abortion's Hardest Cases: Should Parents Have
a Say in a Teenager's Decision to End her Pregnancy? Do Rape Victims Have Special Rights? In the Supreme Court and in Louisiana, the Abortion Battle Lines are
Redefined, TIME, Jul. 9, 1990, at 22.
237. See American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 546,
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gers involved in obtaining an abortion.238 Testimony at trial
further indicated that the judicial bypass procedure is extremely stressful for minors.239 Thus, through delay and added
stress, the parental consent statute would endanger the physical and emotional well-being of minors.24o

2.

Parent-Child Relationships Would Be Injured by the
Parental Consent Statute

The parental consent statute would likely injure the parent-child relationship.241 Cutting to the root of the issue, the
court of appeal noted that "the decision by the minor not to
involve a parent in the abortion decision does not lead to a
poor familial relationship, but is the result of a poor familial
relationship. "242 Appellants' argument, that the statute is

561-62 app. (Ct. App. 1994). The court of appeal noted: "Minors in states having
parental consent statutes delay the decision to undergo an abortion; the percentage
of delayed abortions therefore increases following the implementation of such legis,lation." 1d.
238. See id. at 562 app. The court of appeal explained:
The medical risks of abortion, however, increase as a
pregnancy advances. Any delay in obtaining an abortion
caused by the minor's reluctance to go through with the
judicial bypass procedure, accordingly, is potentially injurious to her health. From this evidence, it follows that the
implementation of A.B. 2274 will harm at least one of the
interests the legislation is intended to further: the physical well-being of the minor.
1d.
239. See American Academy of Pediatrics 11, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 556. The court
of appeal explained that plaintiffs evidence at trial showed that, "forcing an unwilling minor to disclose her decision to abort to a parent or judge causes extreme
stress . . . ." 1d.
240. See id. at 562 app. The court of appeal summarized: "The result is that
the evidence disclosed that the judicial bypass is a costiy, unwieldy and essentially
pointless procedure which achieves no purpose other than to cause stress to minors and delay the implementation of their decision to abort, thus rendering the
abortion more dangerous." 1d.
241. See American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 546, 561
app. (Ct. App. 1994). The court of appeal noted: "[T)he evidence was that compelling a minor to consult a parent about an abortion decision cannot aid, and in
many instances will in fact injure, the parent-child relationship." 1d.
242. American Academy of Pediatrics II, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 560 app. The natural implication of the court of appeal's observation is that the statute will have its
primary impact on minors in precisely the sort of families which would pose the
greatest physical and emotional danger. The court of appeal stated: "Plaintiffs
presented evidence that a significant number of families are abusive or otherwise
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needed so supportive parents can assist their daughter in her
decision,243 loses sight of the fact that supportive families
have no need for a coercive statute to encourage communication. 244
Unfortunately, the parental consent statute would have its
primary impact on minors in families which are not so supportive. 245 In the context of those families, appellants' view of
the parental consent statute's impact is unrealistic; despite the
legislature's best efforts, "[iJt is unlikely that politicians could
write laws to improve communications in unhappy families, or
keep teenagers from becoming pregnant, or provide wise and
caring parents when they do."246 In fact, rigidly mandating
communication between family members can lead to deadly
results.247 The potential danger to minors posed by the paren-

dysfunctional. In a substantial number of these families, adolescent girls are at a
particular risk for violence." 1d. at 561 app.
243. See Appellants' Opening Brief at 9-10, American Academy of Pediatrics v.
Lungren, 882 P.2d 247 (Cal. Sept. 29, 1994) (No. S041459).
244. See Respondents' Answer to Petition for Review at 26-27, American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 32 Cal. Rptr. 546 (Ct. App. 1994) (No. A058627). Respondents observe:
The law does not affect the majority of California families, in which the supportive relationship that has developed over years ensures that young women facing problem
pregnancies will confide in their parents without government compulsion. Rather, the law affects the remaining
teenagers, who live in families' which cannot bear the
stress of the news of a daughter's pregnancy.
1d. at 23-24.
245. See id. Constitutional scholar Laurence Tribe describes the unfortunate
impracticalities of parental consent statutes:
In families where real communication goes on, such laws
are redundant or insulting. And in families where communication has broken down, such laws are unlikely to facilitate respectful dialogue between children in crisis and
their parents. Perhaps a statute could successfully legislate a 'right' for parents to control a daughter's decision
and to force an unwilling child to carry a fetus to
term . . . . But no statute could realistically hope to
legislate love or communication between parents and children.
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 209 (1992).
246. Carlson, supra note 236, at 22.
247. One shocking incident illustrates the seriousness of the threat of violence
to young women in dysfunctional families: in Idaho, a thirteen year-old girl was
shot to death by her father when he learned that he had impregnated her. See
TRIBE, supra note 245, at 202-03 (citing Margie Boule, An American Tragedy,
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tal consent statute is serious and should not be underestimated.
3.

The Parental Consent Statute Would Not Reduce Teen
Pregnancy

Appellants argued at the court of appeal that the statute
would reduce teen pregnancy.248 Appellants had introduced
evidence at trial demonstrating that teen pregnancy rates
decreased in states which had similar parental consent statutes.249 Other rational explanations exist for such statistics,
however. 25o Although evidence shows that abortion rates
dropped in those states, actual pregnancy rates remained
steady.251 Thus, rather than reducing the pregnancy rate, the
primary impact of parental consent statutes was to send minors across state lines to obtain abortions in states without
such restrictive laws. 252 Furthermore, during the same time
period, the pregnancy rate also dropped in states without parental consent laws. 253

PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Aug. 27, 1989, at E1).
248. See American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 546, 561
app. (Ct. App. 1994).
249. See id. In Minnesota, Missouri, and Massachusetts, the teen pregnancy
rate dropped following implementation of parent consent laws. See id.
250. See id. at 561 app. The court of appeal noted: "Plaintiffs, however, countered with evidence that in each instance the pregnancy rate had dropped for
other reasons." See infra notes 251-53 and accompanying text for respondents'
alternative explanations.
251. See American Academy of Pediatrics II, 32 Cal Rptr. 2d at 561 app.
252. See id. The trial court explained: "One study published in 1986 in the
American Journal of Public Health by Virginia Cartoof, Ph.D., and Lorraine
Klerman, D.P.H., concluded that after the Massachusetts consent law went into
effect, an average of 90 to 95 pregnant minors traveled out of that state each
month to obtain an abortion." American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren, No.
884-574, slip. op. at 17 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1992).
253. See American Academy of Pediatrics II, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 561 app. Evidence showed that in Missouri, the teen pregnancy rate had begun to drop before
the statute went into place, and that in Minnesota, the adult pregnancy rate also
dropped during the same time period. American Academy of Pediatrics II, No. 884574, slip op. at 16.
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THE PARENTAL CONSENT STATUTE FAILS TO FuRTHER A
COMPELLING INTEREST

The failure of the statute to further any stated interest
makes an inquiry as to the proper standard of review practically moot. 254 Nevertheless, the California Supreme Court
should apply the compelling interest test. 2M Under the threepart test mandated by Hill v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic
Ass'n,256 the parental consent statute violates minors' constitutionally protected right to privacy.257 Because the right to
privacy involves a vital autonomy interest,25s Hill requires
254. Even if appellants are correct in arguing that a statute regulating minors
need only be supported by significant state interests, the parental consent statute
still must be rejected. Appellants consistently fail to address the parental consent
statute's crucial inadequacy; the statute simply does not further any of the state's
interests.
255. See American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 546,
549-50 (Ct. App. 1994). The "compelling interest test," as applied by the court of
appeal, requires that the State demonstrate that a compelling interest be furthered
by the parental consent statute, that the burden upon privacy rights be justified
by the benefits from the statute, and that those benefits could not be gained by
less burdensome means. See id.
256. 865 P.2d 633 (Cal. 1994).
257. See supra notes 97-113 and accompanying text for a discussion of Hill's
three-part test. The State's arguments on the specific elements of the Hill test are
mostly off-point; rather than arguing that there is no protected privacy interest involved, appellants argue that, according to United States Supreme Court decisions,
parents also have an interest. See Appellants' Opening Brief at 22-35, American
Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 882 P.2d 247 (Cal. Sept. 29, 1994) (No.
S041459). Rather than asserting that minors have no reasonable expectation of
privacy in their reproductive decision-making, appellants argue that, according to
federal jurisprudence, minors' expectations are less reasonable than those of adults.
See id. at 35-37. Finally, rather than contending that the parental consent
statute's invasion of the right to privacy is not serious, appellants simply incorporate the arguments from the first two elements. See id. at 37-38.
Conversely, respondents confront each element specifically and effectively:
minors' right to privacy is protected by the California constitution as interpreted
by California courts. See Respondents' Answer to Petition for Review at 17-19,
American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 546 (Ct. App. 1994)
(No. A058627). Distinguishing minors who would be regulated by this statute from
the voluntary athletes at issue in Hill, respondents argue that minors' reasonable
expectation of privacy is not diminished by any voluntary course of action, such as
joining a sports team. See id. at 19-20. Finally, respondents note that the invasion
of the right to privacy is serious. The parental consent statute is "a law depriving
young women of their ability to decide whether to terminate a pregnancy, enforced
by the State's most coercive authority, criminal sanctions." [d. at 20. Respondents'
serious discussion of the Hill elements establishes the prima facie violation of the
constitutional right.
258. See American Academy of Pediatrics II, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 553. The court
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the State to justify the invasion by demonstrating the furtherance of a compelling interest. 259
The California Supreme Court should affirm the lower
courts' rulings; the parental consent statute fails to meet the
compelling interest standard,260 and thus, unconstitutionally
infringes upon minors' right to privacy.
D. THE PARENTAL CONSENT STATUTE VIOLATES
INFORMATIONAL PRIVACY RIGHTS

The parental consent statute also violates minors' constitutionally protected right. to informational privacy.261 The records compiled by juvenile courts implementing the statute
would consist of private information regarding minors' sexual
and gynecological history.262 Appellants' principal argument

of appeal noted that in cases "involving an invasion of an interest fundamental to
personal autonomy, a compelling state interest must be present to overcome the
vital privacy interest." [d. (citing Hill, 865 P.2d at 653).
259. See Hill, 865 P.2d at 653. The California Supreme Court stated: "Where
the case involves an obvious invasion of an interest fundamental to personal autonomy, e.g., freedom from involuntary sterilization or the freedom to pursue consensual familial relationships, a 'compelling interest' must be present to overcome
the vital privacy interest." [d.
260. See American Academy of Pediatrics II, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 558. The court
of appeal explained:
As we have stated, however, it is not enough for the
Legislature to assert a compelling state interest as justification for the legislation; it also must show that the legislation will in fact further that interest. The trial court
concluded, and we agree, that A.B. 2274 will not protect
the health and welfare of minors, will not foster the parent-child relationship, and will provide only little, if any,
support for any interest in involving parents in the decisions of their children.
[d.
261. See American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren, No. 884-574, slip op. at
31 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1992). The trial court held:
With respect to Plaintiffs' additional argument that A.B.
2274 violates minors' rights to informational privacy, also
guaranteed by article I, section 1, it follows from this
Court's finding that the legislation itself furthers no compelling interest, that the State cannot demonstrate a
compelling interest in maintaining records created solely
to effectuate the procedures provided therein.
[d.
262. See Respondents' Answer to Petition for Review at 27, American Academy
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is that the invasion of privacy is no more extensive than necessary.263 Because the parental consent statute serves no state
interests, however, no infringement of the right to informational privacy is justified.264 Thus, the California Supreme Court
should affirm the trial court's holding that the parental consent statute unconstitutionally violates informational privacy
rights. 266
E.

THE PARENTAL CONSENT STATUTE VIOLATES THE RIGHT TO
EQUAL PROTECTION

Finally, the parental consent statute violates the California Constitution's guarantee of equal protection. 266 Appellants argue that minors seeking prenatal or delivery care and
those seeking abortions are not similarly situated, so the
statute's disparate treatment of these groups is permissible. 267
Appellants contend that there are no public interests in a
minor's right to obtain an abortion, but that there are public
interests in a minor's right to obtain prenatal or delivery
care. 26B Appellants assert that choosing to obtain an abortion

of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 546 (Ct. App. 1994) (No. A058627).
Respondents argue: "This sensitive information, normally shared with medical
professionals, will be recorded in court files and stored indefinitely.ft ld.
263. See Appellants' Opening Brief at 39, American Academy of Pediatrics v.
Lungren, 882 P.2d 247 (Cal. Sept. 29, 1994) (No. S041459). "The minimal collec·
tion of data in furtherance of a compelling state interest does not violate a right
of privacy even of adults." ld. (citing People ex rei. Eichenberger v. Stockton Pregnancy Control Medical Clinic, 249 Cal. Rptr. 762, 771 (Ct. App. 1988».
264. See Respondents' Answer to Petition for Review at 27-28, American Acade·
my of Pediatrics 11 (No. A058627).
265. Because the informational privacy argument constituted an independent
. ground for the trial court's issuance of a permanent injunction against the statute,
it could be addressed by the California Supreme Court. The author notes, however,
that if the supreme court were to strike down the parental consent statute as a
violation of autonomy privacy, it is likely that the court would not reach the issue
of informational privacy.
266. The author believes that the California Supreme Court will strike down
the parental consent statute on privacy grounds; thus, the author believes, the supreme court will most likely not reach the issue of equal protection. See supra
note 265.
267. Appellants' Opening Brief at 45, American Academy of Pediatrics v.
Lungren, 882 P.2d 247 (Cal. Sept. 29, 1994) (No. S041459).
268. ld. at 41. Appellants assert: "[T)he health risks involved [in delaying an
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involves moral issues, whereas obtaining prenatal care in connection with bringing a pregnancy to term involves no such
moral issues. 269
Despite appellants' arguments to the contrary, the California Supreme Court should recognize that the parental consent
statute treats two similarly situated groups disparately.270
Appellants' contentions, that a minor's right to privacy involves
no public interest and that the decision to bring a pregnancy to
term involves no moral decision-making,271 illustrate the
depth of appellants' misperception of the real-world issues at
stake in this case. Both groups have a constitutionally protected privacy interest in their reproductive choice. 272 By applying the most coercive method available in regulating one
group, while leaving the other group unregulated, the parental
consent statute violates equal protection principles. 273
abortion in order to obtain parental consent) are personal to the minor and there
are no public health reasons for not requiring parental consent." 1d. at 42. However, the court of appeal recognized that the longer the decision to obtain an abortion is delayed, the more dangerous the procedure becomes for minors. American
Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 546, 562 (Ct. App. 1994). The
author believes that the danger the statute poses to the physical safety of young
women of California constitutes precisely the sort of "public health reason" that
justifies minors' current ability to obtain an abortion without third party consent.
269. Appellant's Opening Brief at 44, American Academy of Pediatrics II (No.
S041459). Appellants argue: "Abortion involves moral decision making and that
element of the equation is well recognized by our highest courts. The decisions
involved in obtaining prenatal or delivery care simply are not recognized as involving such moral questions." 1d. Appellants apparently consider the decision to become a parent devoid of any moral or ethical component.
Respondents counter: "However, there is an ethical dimension to any decision about pregnancy-whether the decision is to terminate an unplanned pregnancy by abortion or to bear a child and become a parent." Respondents' Brief at 58,
American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 546 (Ct. App. 1994)
(No. A058627). The author agrees with respondents: because both groups have
ethical decisions to make, the statute violates equal protection by regulating only
one group. See id.
270. Respondents' Brief at 51, American Academy of Pediatrics II (No. A058627).
271. See supra notes 176-79 for a discussion of appellants' arguments.
272. See Respondents' Answer to Petition for Review at 28, American Academy
of Pediatrics II (No. A058627). Respondents argue that, "the government is required to justify using its criminal law to place a disproportionate legal burden on
one of two constitutionally protected reproductive choices." [d.
273. Respondents' Brief at 52, American Academy of Pediatrics II (No. A058627).
Respondents argue:
The State's disparate legal requirement for two alternative
medical responses to pregnancy bears no relation to the
consequences of each reproductive option, but reflects the
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VIII. CONCLUSION
California's parental consent statute, which has so far
been rejected by every judicial evaluation, violates the California Constitution. The statute endangers young women's physical and emotional health and threatens to compel these minors
to bear children against their will. Appellants argue that the
California Supreme Court should disregard the State's failure
to prove that the parental consent statute would bring about
any of its stated benefits. Instead, appellants contend, the
supreme court should follow the "brilliant illumination" provided by opinions of the United States Supreme Court interpreting the United States Constitution.274 To do so, the California
Supreme Court would have to disregard the independence of
California's Constitution, ignore the weight of precedent from
California cases, and neglect the safety and well-being of thousands of California's young women.

Michael Grimm·

government's ideological preference for childbirth over
abortion. The State has imposed an elaborate consent
requirement as a barrier to the disfavored reproductive
choice of abortion. By using the criminal laws to influence
teenagers to acquiesce in the state-favored alternative of
childbearing, regardless of their personal aspirations, the
government has violated the California Constitution's
guarantees of privacy and equality.
[d.

274. See Appellants' Opening Brief at 33, American Academy of Pediatrics v.
Lungren, 882 P.2d 247 (Cal. Sept. 29, 1994) (No. S041459); see supra notes 158-60
and accompanying text for a discussion of appellants' suggestion.
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